# 1AC

## 1AC---DPS


### 1AC---Crisis

#### Advantage 1 is Crisis:


#### Marx’s law of profitability explains cyclical recessions and renders capitalism unsustainable


Roberts 15 - London economist citing PhD economists (Michael, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/the-marxist-theory-of-economic-crises-in-capitalism-part-two/, emuse)

Does Marx’s law fit the facts? Some Marxist critics of Marx’s law of profitability reckon that the law cannot be empirically proven or refuted because official statistics cannot be used to show Marx’s law in operation. But there are plenty of studies by Marxist economists that show otherwise. The key tests of the validity of the law in modern capitalist economies would be to show whether 1) the rate of profit falls over time as the organic composition of capital rises; 2) the rate of profit rises when the organic composition falls or when the rate of surplus value rises faster than the organic composition of capital; 3) the rate of profit rises, if there is sharp fall in the organic composition of capital as in a slump. These would be the empirical tests and there is plenty of empirical evidence for the US and world economy to show that the answer is yes to all these questions. For example, [Basu and Manolakos](http://gesd.free.fr/basumano.pdf) applied econometric analysis to the US economy between 1948 and 2007 and found that there was a secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall with a measurable decline of about 0.3 percent a year “after controlling for counter-tendencies.” In [my work on the US rate of profit,](http://gesd.free.fr/mr1213.pdf) I also found an average decline of 0.4 percent a year through 2009. And here is a figure by G Carchedi for the rise in the organic composition of capital (OCC) in the industrial sector of the US since 1947 versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V) versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V)


[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/arp.png)

There is a clear inverse correlation between a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit. Can Marx’s law explain crises? How does Marx’s law of profitability work as an explanation and forecast of slumps in capitalist economies? The law leads to a clear causal connection to regular and recurrent crises (slumps). It runs from falling profitability to falling profits to falling investment to falling employment and incomes. A bottom is reached when there is sufficient destruction of capital values (the writing off technology, the bankruptcy of companies, a reduction in wage costs) to raise profits and then profitability. Then rising profitability leads to rising investment again. The cycle of boom recommences and the whole ‘crap’ starts again, to use Marx’s colourful phrase. [There is a cycle of profit alongside the long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall.](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/cycles-in-capitalism.pdf)

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profit-cycle.png) The evidence of this causality between profit and investment is available. Jose Tapia Granados, using regression analysis, finds that, over 251 quarters of US economic activity from 1947, profits started declining long before investment did and that pre-tax profits can explain 44% of all movement in investment, while there is no evidence that investment can explain any movement in profits. I find a higher ‘Granger causality’ of 60% from annual changes in profit and investment (unpublished) and a correlation of 0.67 for the period since 2000. And see this by G Carchedi ([Carchedi Presentation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/carchedi-presentation.pptx)). In the period leading up to the Great Recession 2008-9, we can see the causality visually for US profits, investment and real GDP in the graphic below. The mass of US corporate profit peaks in mid-2006, investment and GDP follows two years later. Profits turn back up in late 2008 and investment follows one year later.

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profits-lead.png)

There are two basic regularities shown by the data: that a change in profits tends to be followed next year by a change in investment in the same direction; and that a change in investment is usually followed in a few years by changes in profits in the opposite direction. Thus we have a cycle. From these results, the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that profitability stagnated in 2013 and declined in 2014 (and now the mass of profits in 2015) after growing between 2008 and 2012, it can be concluded with some confidence that a recession of the US economy, which will be also part of a world economic crisis like the Great Recession, will occur again in the next few years. And Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall makes an even more fundamental prediction: that the capitalist mode of production will not be eternal, that it is transitory in the history of human social organisation. The law of the tendency predicts that, over time, there will be a fall in the rate of profit globally, delivering more crises of a devastating character. Work has been done by modern Marxist analysis that confirms that the world rate of profit has fallen over the last 150 years. See the graph below ([data from Esteban Maito](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/maito-esteban-the-historical-transience-of-capital-the-downward-tren-in-the-rate-of-profit-since-xix-century.pdfhttp:/gesd.free.fr/mrwrate.pdf) and ‘doctored’ by me).

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/world-rate-of-profit-maito.png) Maito’s data for the 19th century have recently been questioned ([DUMENIL-LEVY on MAITO](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dumenil-levy-on-maito.pdf)), but in a recent work using different sources and countries, I find a similar trend for the post-1945 period globally ([Revisiting a world rate of profit June 2015](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/revisiting-a-world-rate-of-profit-june-2015.pdf)). And earlier groundbreaking work by Minqi Li and colleagues, as well as by Dave Zachariah, show a similar trend. As Maito concludes: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its empirical confirmation highlights the historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit measures the vitality of the capitalist system, the logical conclusion is that it is getting closer to its endpoint. There are many ways that capital can attempt to overcome crises and regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to the capitalist mode of production and allow, ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This is a characteristic aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit over the long term. So the arguments claiming that there is an inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the rate of profit and its own vitality and which therefore considers the capitalist mode of production as a natural and a-historical phenomenon, are refuted by the empirical evidence.” So the law predicts that, as the organic composition of capital rises globally, the rate of profit will fall despite counteracting factors and despite successive crises (which temporarily help to restore profitability). This shows that capital as a mode of production and social relations is transient. Capitalism has not always been here and it has ultimate limits, namely capital itself. It has a ‘use-by-date’. That is the essence of the law of profitability for Marx. Alternative theories This is not to deny other factors in capitalist crises. The role of credit is an important part of Marxist crisis theory and indeed, as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall engenders countertendencies, one of increasing importance is the expansion of credit and the switching of surplus value into investment in fictitious capital rather than productive capital to raise profitability temporarily, but with eventually disastrous consequences, as The Great Recession shows ([The Great Recession](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/the-great-recession.pdf); [Debt matters](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/debt-matters.pdf)). Alternative theories of crisis like underconsumption, or the lack of effective demand, are taken from theories from the reactionary Thomas Malthus and the radical Sismondi in the early 19th century and then taken up by Keynes in the 1930s and by modern inequality theorists like Stiglitz and [post-Keynesian economists](http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15854). But lack of demand and rising inequality cannot explain the regularity of crises or predict the next one. These theories do not have strong empirical backing either ([Does inequality causes crises](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/does-inequality-causes-crises.pdf)). Professor Heinrich, after concluding that Marx did not have a theory of crisis and dropped the law of profitability, [does offer a vague one of his own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/the-two-michaels-heinrich-and-roberts-in-berlin-dogmatism-versus-doubt/): namely capital accumulates and produces more means of production blindly. This gets out of line with consumption demand from workers. So a ‘gap’ develops that has to be filled by credit, but somehow this cannot hold up things indefinitely and production then collapses. Well, it is a sort of a theory, but pretty much the same as the underconsumption (overproduction) theory that Heinrich himself dismisses and [Marx dismissed 150 years ago.](http://www.mcg-j.org/swp_arc/english/etheory/economics/eprm29-2.htm) It seems way less convincing or empirically supported that Marx’s own theory of crisis based on the law of profitability. No other theory, whether from mainstream economics or from heterodox economics, can explain recurrent and regular crises and offer a clear objective foundation for the transience of the capitalist system.

#### Profitability will hit zero by 2054---but converging tipping points ensure collapse much sooner

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.patreon.com/posts/socialism-is-now-37023695>, emuse)

That capitalism is unsustainable has long been empirically observable. Most obviously, manufacturing costs and consumer commodity prices are trending towards zero. For example, whereas the world’s fastest supercomputer in 1975 was worth $5m ($32m in 2013’s money), the price of an iPhone 4 released in 2010 with the equivalent performance was $400. Aerospace companies producing propulsion systems in 2010 for $24m in 24 months are now 3-D printing their engines for $2,000 in two weeks. And rather than having globalised supply chains, such companies foresee the entire rocket being built in ‘at home’ [7]. While ‘offshoring’ manufacturing jobs to the ‘low-income economies’ is said to save up to 65% on labour costs, replacing human workers with robots saves up to 90% [8]. Unlike workers, robots do not need wages, breaks, sick days, holidays or pensions. And they work quicker in the first place, too. While industrialisation, particularly in Asia, saw 83 ‘developing countries’ achieving growth rates by the early 2000s that were more than twice the rate of the ‘developed’ OECD members, the rest of the world has seen the same opportunity end ‘prematurely’. Latin America and Africa are already deindustrialising (shifting to services-based workforces) – from a much lower starting point than Asia [9]. Whereas industrialisation peaked in western European countries at income levels of around $14,000, India and many sub-Saharan African countries appear to have reached their peak manufacturing employment at income levels of $700 (both at 1990 levels) [10]. Not only do robots and 3D-printing increasingly remove the incentive for capitalists based in the US and Europe to exploit workers overseas, the incentive to exploit transit workers – who add production time/value to the commodities they transport around the world – is also removed [11]. The emergence of cellular agriculture (lab-grown food), with falling prices and rising quality estimated to see the beef industry go bust by 2035, is going to have the same effect [12]. For the past 145 years, the imperialist powers – the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan – have been increasingly compelled to export capital (invest) overseas in order to expand and cheapen their exploitable labour bases, thereby sustaining their own economies by living off profits generated by commodity-producing workers in the ‘developing world’. Britain, for example, exported capital equal to 560% of its GDP in 2014 [13]. Between 1980 and 2012 the net outflows of capital from ‘developing’ countries being funnelled into ‘developed’, ie imperialist nations, totalled $16.3 trillion [14]. But the economic relation that underpins imperialism is now unravelling. If prices are trending historically towards zero, so too must the ‘global’ aggregate rate of profit. According to Estaban Maito’s estimates, it fell in a secular trend from 43% in the 1870s to 17% in the 2000s, and is (as of 2014) on course to reach zero around 2054 [15]. Automation and absolute overaccumulation But as the criminally under-appreciated Polish Marxist Henryk Grossman warned in 1929, capitalism is bound to collapse “much earlier than a zero rate of profit” [16], because capital, inherently, does not accumulate harmoniously – the process tends to break down. Overaccumulated capital – surplus capital that has become unprofitable to reinvest – is inevitable. It causes every recession, a partial and temporary breakdown, and is at the same time an underproduction of surplus value; ie, too little profit has been generated to preserve and expand the value of total capital. (Surplus value, or surplus labour time, is the amount of value the capitalist appropriates from the worker, who, on average, keeps only what they need to subsist, their necessary labour time. Profit then is essentially unpaid labour, which tends to increase with innovation. Hence falling prices.) Debt therefore rises to ‘fill the gap’ caused by this underproduction, but can only cover the lag in profit for so long before recession becomes inevitable, since investors are bound to withdraw funds when growth becomes too stagnant, channelling this new surplus instead into tax havens, land and the competitive gambling of speculation that generates financial ‘bubbles’. Each breakdown is overcome through the sufficient destruction, cheapening and centralisation of capital. But the resulting innovation means fewer workers tend to remain employed relative to total capital. Despite the increased rate of exploitation that temporarily lifts profit rates, the next overaccumulation tends to be greater than the one which preceded it. There is no such thing as ‘technological unemployment’ though – alongside surplus capital grows unexploitable surplus labour (unemployment). Clearly, the closer we get to the completion of the historical trend towards fully-automated production, the closer capitalism gets to its final breakdown. Production is already highly automated. As James Manyika, McKinsey Global Institute director, said in June 2017: “Find a factory anywhere in the world built in the past five years  –  not many people work there.” But the services jobs – relatively unproductive since they tend to handle near-finished commodities, if they handle commodities at all – that replaced manufacturing work are now becoming increasingly automated, too. In Britain, where services count for 80% of economic activity, the number of supermarket checkout assistants fell by 25.3% between 2011 and 2017. At the end of March, after most countries had entered lockdown, almost half of company bosses in 45 countries said they were speeding up plans to automate their businesses. [17] Innovation always takes place most rapidly during a recession, when prices are low. With lockdown turning the home into the place of work, Microsoft could boast of having discovered a fresh way of reducing labour costs and extending absolute labour time as it announced “two years’ worth of digital transformation in two months”. As The Guardian reported at the end of April: “Bank branches were already closing in droves before the epidemic, but here is the perfect excuse to shut more. And that’s not all. The authors of an Oxford University study thought that by 2035 it would be possible to automate 86% of restaurant jobs, three-quarters of retail jobs, and 59% of recreation jobs. By unlucky coincidence, those are among the very industries hardest hit by an epidemic now demanding quantum leaps in efficiency if some companies are to avoid going under.” [18] But automation is abolishing the source of profit, ie, commodity-producing human labour. To be more precise, automation is the final expression of capitalism’s self-abolishing tendency. As Marx wrote in 1858: “As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure... Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [19] But this dissolution does not happen in a seamless falling rate of profit towards zero, since – as explained, and as indicated by both zig-zagging profit rates and the recessions that tend to strike roughly every 10 years – capital does not accumulate harmoniously. As the Soviet Russian philosopher Genrikh Volkov wrote in 1967, increasing automation eventually leads to “the breakdown, instead of the consolidation, of the existing relations ... of the private ownership of the means of production…. Its consummation is incompatible with capitalism.” [20] In Capital, Marx anticipates an eventual “absolute overaccumulation” of capital. “The limit of capitalist production is the excess time of the labourers,” says Marx. [21] But stretching the rate of exploitation of the working class to anywhere near 100% is obviously impossible – for starters, capital cannot even afford to exploit an ever-increasing part of it, a surplus population that grows alongside surplus capital, while workers in the growing services sector are also relatively unproductive. “As the capitalist mode of production develops, an ever larger quantity of capital is required to employ the same, let alone an increased, amount of labour-power.” But there are other limits too: “As soon as capital would, therefore, have grown in such a ratio to the labouring population that neither the absolute working time supplied by this population, nor the relative surplus working time, could be expanded any further (this last would not be feasible at any rate in the case where the demand for labour were so strong that there were a tendency for wages to rise); at a point, therefore when the increased capital produced just as much, or even less, surplus value than it did before its increase, there would be absolute overproduction of capital.” [22] From zero interest rates to worldwide hyperinflation If the rate of profit is on course to hit zero around 2054, but the final breakdown is bound to happen much earlier than that, it at least becomes impossible to dismiss the theory that we are entering this uncharted territory right now. But empirically, there also seem to be several approaching economic limits or ‘tipping points’ which cannot be converging at the same time merely by coincidence. For starters, average GDP growth rates in what the World Bank defines as ‘high income countries’ are already closing in on zero, having fallen every decade for the past half century: from 5.59% in the 1960s, to 4.15% in the 1970s, 2.93% in the 1980s, 2.35% in the 1990s, and 1.78% in the 2000s. The figure rose slightly to 1.97% in the years 2010-2017, but this minor reprieve has already proven to be unsustainable. GDP in the imperialist nations, though, is inflated by the profits leached from the rest of the world, since much of the profit from each commodity goes towards the GDP of the nation in which it is sold, rather than where it was made. [23] Productivity growth in the high income countries has itself, since 2011, spluttered below 1%. Aggregate global debt (the total debt of governments, corporations and households), already mountainous before the Great Recession, has hit new heights, indicating record-high overaccumulation [24]. According to the IMF, global debt fell by 1.5% of GDP in 2017 compared to a year earlier, but remained more than 11 percentage points of GDP above the previous high in 2009. In June 2019, the IMF said global debt stood officially at $184 trillion, 225% of global GDP. This averages out at $86,000 for every person in the world, 2.5 times average annual per capita income. But according to financial analyst Ron Surz, once ‘off-the-books’ net obligations such as social security and health care are taken into account, official figures are understated by a factor of 2.5, making actual global debt $460 trillion, 560% of GDP and $215,000 per person (as of July 2019) [25]. He put the US figure not at the official 105%, but 390%. Even that is without taking into account the serious accounting problem in the US Department of Defense. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion [26]. The US defence budget has ballooned to $748bn as the long-time imperialist superpower scrambles to hold on to its dying empire. Another financial analyst, Simon Thorpe, calculated in 2015 that global debt was 2.5 times higher than the global money supply (up from two times higher in 2013) [27]. This is despite the fact that the US’s monetary base exploded from $842bn in August 2008 to $2.9 trillion in January 2013 and then $4 trillion in August 2014. The sheer amount of debt is unsustainable since the tax base needed to pay it is obviously shrinking in relative terms. Though it has been socialised, it is now simply too large to work off. Something the capitalist state can do to ease the government’s ability to pay its debt is reduce interest rates, which also makes borrowing cheaper and stimulates lending, maintaining the circulation of money. But lifting the economy out of recession usually takes a 4-5% base interest rate cut. In the US and across Europe base rates are already at zero, having been cut by around only 2%. Central banks have said going negative would make the banks unviable. Therefore, it is highly probable – lockdown or no lockdown – that capitalism, as Pento says, is soon going to spiral for the first time in its history into a crisis of worldwide hyperinflation, since rates will have to start going back up to re-incentivise bond holding and sustain the tax base. But debt-to-GDP – already at record highs and rising – will surge, and so the tax base will continue to shrink; bondholders will realise that what they are owed cannot be repaid and increasingly transfer their funds into hard assets, especially precious metals. The only way to avoid hyperinflation is for states to default on their debt through hyperdeflation – which the record bailouts imply they are understandably trying to avoid – but that would happen after hyperinflation anyway. The US’s national annual deficit is now expected to soar from $984bn in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2020. The US has never meaningfully defaulted on its debt but, historically, countries that have failed to get their debt-to-GDP back below 90% have gone on to default, meaning they have had to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bail out (usually in the form of high-interest loans and on the condition of privatising state assets). But given that the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency – all oil must be traded in US dollars, for example, making the solvency of all countries dependent on their ability to purchase US dollars – the IMF effectively is the US. The US dollar has lost more than 96% of its value, its purchasing power, since 1913. The figure is more than 99.5% for British pound sterling, compared to 1694, the year it was founded [28]. This is why negative rates would make the banks unviable – they would finish off the depreciation of fiat currency. Many countries, including Russia and China, have started diversifying their foreign currency reserves in the past few years, meaning the main source of financing US debt is disappearing. Even the biggest US bank, JP Morgan, told its clients in August 2019 to sell the dollar. The world economy will likely soon be without a reserve currency. While smaller economies have survived defaults through bailouts in the past, the US and western European countries are the richest and most developed in the world. They represent monopoly capitalism, or imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. As mentioned, with their workforces now largely services-based, the imperialist nations have been largely living off of profit produced by the labour of commodity-producing workers in Africa, Asia and South America. If the imperialist economies collapse, it’s because the whole system has collapsed. Indeed, as of 7 March, investors had already pulled $83bn from developing markets, the largest capital outflow ever recorded, according to the Institute of International Finance. If all these converging factors – near-zero prices, flat productivity growth, unsustainably high debt, zero interest rates, exhausted currencies – do not constitute a final breakdown of the system, then what will?

#### Mounting dysfunction drives imperialism and inter-capitalist competition---risks nuclear war

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

We have seen that the crisis is intensifying competition between the major imperialist and capitalist powers. The counter-tendencies have failed to prevent the onset of the next crisis. An even greater devaluation of capital and labour power is required. The death and destruction wrought by war is the ultimate source of devaluation and therefore the most important counter-tendency. If war wasn’t an inevitability under capitalism, militarism would be done away with since it is funded through taxation that could otherwise be put towards productive capital. Many Marxists have failed to grasp this. Luxemburg, for example, claimed that “from the purely economic point of view, militarism is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus-value; it is in itself a sphere of accumulation”.[496] Again, her analysis was based on circulation, not production. Grossman counters that “this is how things may appear from the standpoint of individual capital as military supplies have always been the occasion for rapid enrichment. But from the standpoint of the total capital, militarism is a sphere of unproductive consumption. Instead of being saved, values are pulverised. Far from being a sphere of accumulation, militarism slows down accumulation. By means of indirect taxation a major share of the income of the working class which might have gone into the hands of the capitalists as surplus value is seized by the state and spent mainly for unproductive purposes.” On the other hand, though, apart from natural resources, the main resource the capitalists are fighting over in a war is human labour, enough of which is not available at home. What better way to decimate the wages of this new source of surplus value than through warfare? And as well as the destruction of capital value, innovation is accelerated by the arms race, leading to new use-values for the post- war civilian economy and furthering devaluation. Idealists claimed the fall of the Soviet Union would bring about a new era of world peace. The destruction of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen since then shows both that they did not appreciate the nature of imperialism or the protection the Soviet Union afforded to countries threatened by imperialism. Who is next for daring to seek independence? Venezuela? Iran? Russia and China have been encircled by NATO in the biggest build- up of military forces since the Second World War. As the crisis of accumulation deepens, the size and frequency of wars tend to grow. In the wake of 9/11, the author Zoltan Grossman circulated a list, based on Congressional Records and The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, of 133 US military interventions from 1890 to 2001. The average per year is 1.15 before, and 1.29 after, the Second World War. After the Cold War, from late 1989, the figure rises to 2.0. The Democrat Barack Obama replaced the gung-ho Republican warmonger George W Bush in 2008 promising ‘hope’ and ‘change’. But by the end of his second term in 2016, US special operators could be found in 70% – 138 – of the world’s nations, a huge jump of 130% since Bush left office. In 2016 alone, the Obama administration sanctioned the use of at least 26,171 bombs. “This means that every day last year, the US military blasted combatants or civilians overseas with 72 bombs; that’s three bombs every hour, 24 hours a day,” Medea Benjamin of the anti-war CodePink wrote in The Guardian.[500] In 2017, Trump – who in his April 2016 foreign policy speech said that “war and aggression will not be my first instinct” because he wanted to spend the money instead domestically to ‘make America great again’ – outstripped Obama’s 2016 figure by 9,000. Given that many of these wars are fought in an alliance of the imperialist powers, mainly through NATO, much analysis on the Left makes the mistake of thinking that inter-imperialist rivalry no longer exists. This follows on from Kautsky who, because he did not see war as arising from economic necessity, came up with a theory of “ultra- imperialism” whereby the imperialists would realise that it was not in their interests to continue the First World War and would therefore unite to “peaceably redivide the world". Something like this – to a limited extent – did temporarily emerge, but only after the Second World War, only in collective opposition to the Soviet Union, and during a period in which capitalism was recovering in the wake of the war’s devaluation of capital, meaning competition had temporarily diminished. But the barbaric aggression of the wars on the Middle East is symptomatic of deepening capitalist crisis and intensifying rivalry. Through their opposition to the 2003 war on Iraq, France and Germany showed that they are not subordinate to US interests. In the 1990s, TotalFinaElf, France’s huge oil firm, secured the contract to develop Iraq’s southern Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields, containing as much as 25% of the country's reserves. German firms were the market leaders in supplying sensitive dual-use technology to Iraq in the years before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and they had been bidding for more civilian commercial contracts. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, called Germany “the hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s”. France and Germany did not want new competition. Between the start of 2002 to March 2003 the dollar fell by 20% against the euro. The US had to respond to this: its international economic domination is bound up with the dollar’s strength as the world’s currency anchor. The dollar’s dominance as the main currency for foreign exchange enables it to blackmail countries that do not yield to its demands. Ultimately, the strength of a currency reflects the productivity and size of the economy behind it. Trump’s administration has claimed that Germany is using its currency to “exploit” both its neighbours and the US, sparking fears of a currency war. The US made the desperate accusation that Germany is “under-consuming” goods and services from other countries. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, the US made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the size of current account surpluses to 4% of GDP. Germany’s surplus overtook China’s in absolute size in 2017 and as a share of GDP became much larger. The IMF put Germany’s 2017 surplus as 8.1% of GDP and China’s at 1.6%. The EU’s surplus as a whole in 2017 was $387.1bn. In contrast, the US current account deficit was $462bn in 2017, bigger only than Britain’s $91.4bn. The deficit was 2.5% of GDP in the first quarter, up from 2.4% in the fourth quarter. Bush warned that the US would “neither forgive nor forget” if France continued to oppose the war on Iraq. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld accused Austria of blocking US troop movements from Germany to Italy and said the US was considering bringing home 100,000 troops stationed in Europe (70,000 in Germany) or relocating them to Eastern Europe. He threatened sanctions for “one reason only: to harm the German economy”. At the time, the US controlled 31.5% of world output to the EU’s 26%. However in 2004 ten additional countries were scheduled to join the 15 EU member states, a combination that would match the size of the US’s economy and exceed its population. FRFI – one of the few left-wing publications in Britain to anticipate the potential for conflict between the US and EU – reported in 2003 that total EU FDI already amounted to 52.5% of the world total, nearly 2.5 times that of the US. Over the period 1980-2001, the US share of the global total has halved. The massive rise in the US’s military spending has been necessitated by the need to reverse the decline of its economic dominance – to reiterate, if it doesn’t reverse this it won’t be able to valorise its capital. The Department of Defense’s base budget grew by 31% between 2000 and 2014. An $82bn hike to $716bn in 2018 represented an increase that by itself was larger than the entire defence budget of every country on earth, save China. Trump called the Defense Department’s annual budget “crazy” and proposed a 5% cut, but then committed to a $750bn budget for 2019. Who is really in charge? US military spending is at least 10 times the size of Russia’s, and four times the size of China’s. This is the same Department of Defense with a serious existing accounting problem. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion. Clearly this is unsustainable. As Engels says, “the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general”. US manufacturing output in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, constituted 27% of the economy and provided 24% of employment. In 2003 manufacturing amounted to 13.8% of its GDP, falling to 12.5% in 2015, and 10.5% of employment, falling to 8.8% in 2013. The US industrial base is shrinking and with it the manufacturing and engineering capacity to achieve military domination of the world. In November 2004 Le Monde Diplomatique reported that, “Some new (EU) states are large arms producers and exporters. The EU is now home to more than 400 companies in 23 countries manufacturing small arms and light weapons – hardly less than the US.” China’s manufacturing sector is now almost as large as those of the US, Japan and Germany combined. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 its military expenditure was almost $400bn; Iraq’s was $1.4bn, 0.35% of the US’s. In violation of the Iraqi constitution and international law the US-UK Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “laid off hundreds of thousands of Iraqi workers, virtually eliminated trade tariffs and enacted laws that radically alter Iraq’s economy. Order 39, decreed by CPA head Paul Bremer on September 20 2003, abolished Iraq's ban on foreign investment, allowing foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors except natural resources. Over 200 state-owned enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals have been privatised. Iraq's highest tax rate has been lowered from 45% to a flat rate of 15%. Although foreign ownership of land remains illegal, companies or individuals will be allowed to lease properties for up to 40 years.” The extraction of Iraq’s oil was also illegal. In 2011 government documents leaked to The Independent revealed that in November 2002, five months before the invasion, the UK Foreign Office invited BP to talks about opportunities in Iraq “post regime change”. Labour’s Baroness Symons, the then Trade Minister, promised BP that she would lobby the Bush administration because the oil giant feared it was being “locked out” of deals that Washington was quietly negotiating with the French and Russian governments and their energy firms. Control over territory, oil and oil transhipment routes is of paramount importance. With around 60% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East has been the key battleground. But this rivalry is playing out all over the world, in South America, Asia, Africa and, since the fall of the USSR, central and eastern Europe, which was identified by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 as “a stable and promising region for FDI”. China, whose contribution to global GDP was expected to eclipse that of the US in 2018, is a particular concern to the traditional powers because its strategy of offering low- or even interest-free loans in exchange for fixed-price sales of primary commodities makes it a more attractive business partner to underdeveloped countries who have been bled dry by high interest loans from the IMF. The US only has intimidation and force left to offer in response. In 2008, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a deal with China for roads, railways, clinics, hospitals, schools and two new universities worth $6bn. In exchange, China was given the right to extract 12 million tonnes of copper and cobalt over 25 years. In 2004, when Angola was reluctant to accept the terms of an IMF loan, China stepped in with a no-strings-attached $2bn. An Angolan minister said relations with China “not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect”. China has overtaken Britain, France and the US as a trading partner with Africa. In 2017, China’s trade with Africa was worth $170bn, four-times larger than US-Africa trade. China invested $125bn in Africa in the decade to 2016 and committed to $60bn more over the next three years. In 2017 China’s trade with Latin America reached $244bn, again exceeding that of the US. China’s dominance in manufacturing has forced Latin American countries to deindustrialise somewhat and focus on producing primary commodities; but China’s investments have also had the effect of strengthening their currencies relative to the dollar. In July 2016, the RAND Corporation think tank warned that, whereas the US would have been capable of achieving a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses in a war with China in 2015, China’s improving anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities meant that a war in 2025 would instead be “prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive”. The earlier part of that prediction seemed optimistic, given that the US became bogged down in the face of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan for years when it expected quick, decisive victories in both, against forces inferior to China’s. Indeed, in March 2019 a RAND analyst said that its war game simulations showed that “when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it”. He said it would cost an extra $24bn a year to turn things around. Chinese and Russian opposition to US deployments of anti-missile systems in Asia has resulted in their greater military cooperation. However, Russia is using its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to try and contain Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia, where it has regional ambitions of its own. As Trevor Rayne wrote in FRFI: “The US turns to alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia to confront China, but China offers them investments and better trade deals. If it has to the US ruling class will resort to military force to prevent China ejecting it from its dominant position in the world. Competition between the imperialist powers may be limited to geopolitical manoeuvring, ideological and cyber warfare and negotiation table diplomacy for now, but that cannot last forever. At some point the capitalist crisis will become so deep that the imperialist powers will be forced into direct confrontation with each other. The overaccumulation of capital will have become so great that the only way to sufficiently devalue capital and labour power will be through global conflagration. This tendency expresses itself in increasing competition between the imperialist powers as they vie to attain dominance – that is, to apportion losses to one another, to seize each other’s capital and resources by any means. This is what happened in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Great Depression and fascism were the counter-tendencies and crisis measures required over a span of 41 years to keep the accumulation process going and eventually revive it to a healthy enough level to restore political stability. Kautsky – because he believed accumulation was harmonious – claimed that absolute capitalist breakdown would be brought about inevitably by world war, which in his view would happen only because of uncivilised ruling classes.[513] On the other side of the same coin, Bukharin and Varga believed the Second World War would bring about the completion of the world revolution. This perhaps partly explains some of the controversial decisions taken by the Communist International after 1929, when it effectively ordered its national sections in Europe to take social democratic routes to socialism.[514] Grossman says: “It would be useless to search Bukharin for any other cause of the breakdown of capitalism than the ravages created by war.... If like Bukharin, we expect the breakdown of capitalism to flow from a second round of imperialist wars, then it is necessary to point out that wars are not peculiar to the imperialist stage of capitalism. They stem from the essence of capitalism as such, during all its stages, and have been a constant symptom of capital since its historical inception.... far from being a threat to capitalism, wars are a means of prolonging the existence of the capitalist system as a whole.” Grossman was at pains to show that Kautsky’s was a subjective analysis and that the opposite was true: that massive overaccumulation brought about a systemic breakdown and world war followed necessarily because it was the only way to sufficiently devalue capital, to “ward off imminent collapse” and “create a breathing space” for accumulation to restart. Grossman cites the figure from Wladimir Woytinsky’s 1925 book The World In Numbers that “around 35% of the wealth of mankind was destroyed and squandered in the four years” of the First World War, which had been preceded by a worldwide Long Depression – like the one we’re experiencing now – a series of economic ‘panics’ in the US, and intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries over trade routes and colonial territories. By the end of the war, says Grossman, the mass of living labour “confronted a reduced capital, and this created new scope for accumulation”. And yet it wasn’t enough – the 1929 Wall Street Crash followed, “a continuation of the unresolved economic crisis preceding World War One”, as Mattick says.[519] The New Deal attempted to resolve the crisis in the US and fascism attempted to resolve it in Germany (the equivalent of a New Deal in Germany through the SPD’s reforms having already failed before 1929). Neither worked. It would take an even more destructive global war to end the depression. This after Kautsky had claimed in 1927 that capitalism stood, “from a purely economic point of view, stronger than ever”.[520] The First World War – “legalised slaughter” in the apt words of Harry Patch, the last surviving combat soldier of that war from any country – killed 37 million people. The Second World War killed between 70 million and 85 million, 3% of the 1940 world population of an estimated 2.3 billion. The equivalent today from a world population of 7.53 billion would be 226 million. But given that today’s total accumulation and overaccumulation are considerably greater than before World War Two, it follows that it would take a considerably greater level of destruction to – again, temporarily – resolve the crisis. Given that and the fact that every major war following economic breakdown is decided only by total war (the US Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Crimean War being other prime examples), it could be argued that the amount of destruction required is so high now that today’s deepening crisis may at some point necessitate nothing short of a nuclear exchange between the imperialist powers. The Second World War ended with the US dropping the A-bomb on Japan, after all. If World War Three was not sufficiently destructive, then a bigger crisis would follow necessitating World War Four, just as World War Two followed World War One. And of course a Fourth World War would be necessitated at some point anyway. This is all assuming that the crisis that preceded a World War Three wasn’t the final breakdown, the absolute historical limit of capital accumulation. If it were then no amount of destruction could save capitalism. As we said earlier, this is surely now the case – there can be no 1945 productivity boom that breathes another century of life into the system, for automation has already all but abolished the law of value. The current arms race is in fact already accelerating the development of automation and therefore the rate of profit’s historical fall towards zero. We therefore assert that – aside from the fact that a world war today would end life on Earth and destroy the climate for good – even a world war cannot save capitalism this time. Rather than trying to destroy itself in order to renew itself this time, capitalism is now preparing to either destroy or wind itself up for good. Trade wars will continue to intensify. Protectionism becomes an increasingly inevitable reflex as nations attempt to defend domestic and overseas assets; combined with stagnant productivity, this tends to manifest politically in a parochial, ‘anti-globalisation’ nationalism, ie right-wing populism or proto-fascism, as capitalists which rely more on the domestic market – determining their conservatism – finally gain the upper-hand over the more liberal exporting sectors, only to deepen the overall economic crisis by making trade increasingly expensive and centralising capital into yet fewer hands. As Michael Pettis wrote in the FT in 2009, the fact that “nearly everyone agrees that a world that retreats into direct and indirect forms of trade protection is a world that is worse off... should not allay our worries. In the 1930s, it was also well understood that the crisis would be exacerbated by plunging international trade. This did not stop a descent into the protectionism which put the ‘Great’ into the Great Depression.” In February 2019, a senior European Commission economist warned that a Third World War is an increasingly “high probability” due to the “disintegration of global capitalism”.[523] Professor Hanappi, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration , noted that the emerging trade wars, massive growth of military spending and return of ‘populism’ bear unnerving similarities with trends that beset the world before the outbreak of the first two world wars. Marx wrote that as soon as capital feels itself threatened it will “seek refuge in other forms”, which appear to perfect its rule as capital “through curbs on free competition”; although the curbs on competition “appear to complete the mastery of capital, they are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the mode of production based on it”.[524] This applies to both the monopolistic stage of capitalism and the inevitability of protectionism. As mentioned, in 2015-16, the G20 economies introduced a record number of trade-restrictive measures. Globalisation was in retreat before Brexit and Trump, because its ability to expand capital is increasingly exhausted. Just as protectionism and trade wars were precursors of the first two world wars, Brexit and Trump’s trade wars threaten to be precursors of a Third World War. Just as the first two world wars were fought between the biggest imperialist rivals, so would a third. That would mean a conflict between the US and its strongest competitor, the German-led EU. On 6 November 2018 France President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” so that the EU could defend itself from “China, Russia and even the United States of America”, adding: “When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty[525] which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security.” Germany already provides the most troops for the UN’s so-called peacekeeping missions. Building on the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) agreement – which allows co-operation on joint military projects for 25 EU member states, established through the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017 – the European Commission provisionally agreed the founding of a €13bn European Defence Fund (EDF) in February. This is to allow joint R&D projects for European companies. Though no formal agreement is to come into effect until November 2019, it is already known that the fund will exclude both post-Brexit Britain and the US. In response the US complained that the moves undermine the NATO alliance and threatened sanctions on EU firms if either project goes ahead. The EU told the the US not to concern itself with Europe's defence plans. In December 2019 Macron said NATO was already “brain dead”, because “you have no co-ordination of decision-making whatsoever between the US and its NATO allies”. In reality, Europe is still reliant upon the US in military matters, a point made clear by, for example, the dominance of US firms in international contracts or the US’s role in NATO. Accordingly, the EU is, to some degree, split upon the US’s INF withdrawal, with key US allies Britain and Poland offering their unwavering support for the move. While disagreement in Europe over the Treaty itself is small, this reflects broader splits within the EU imperialist bloc, more evident in regard to trade and inter-European political discussions. More significantly in military terms, the US’s dominance over Europe’s military capacity means that Europe requires both time and new alliances if it is to stand on its own feet. Europe is now waking up to this. In July, Macron announced that France would build “a large space command within the Air Force, which will eventually become the Air and Space Force... to better protect our satellites, including in an active way”. Analysts called the move a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture. Macron's proposal follows similar moves by the US, China and Russia in recent years. In 2018, Trump ordered the formation of a sixth branch of the US’s armed forces – a "space force”. Europe's imperialists may have once hoped that the end of Trump's Presidency could see a reconciliation with the US bourgeoisie on more advantageous terms, but such hopes seem to be nothing but a fantasy. On 13 November 2018, a bipartisan panel for the US Congress issued a report stating its approval of the Trump administration's pursuit of “great power competition”. In March 2019, Nicole Gibson, Deputy Director of the US State Department’s office for Europe, warned that European companies would “risk significant sanctions” if they resume laying pipe for the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Construction work was suspended in the December because of winter weather. The deal has infuriated the US because it undermines the potential for its energy giants to export surplus shale gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, US clients in central Europe are also set to lose out. Snaking under the Baltic Sea, NS2 replaces an older pipeline, stripping Ukraine of gas transit fees worth $2.5bn a year, 4% of its GDP. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko[526] fears NS2 would allow Russia to switch off gas to Ukraine and Central Europe to blackmail its nearer neighbours without disrupting supplies to Western Europe, enabling the Kremlin to exert greater political influence. Russia supplies more than one-third of the natural gas Europe uses, a figure that is expected to reach nearly 50% in the next decade. German businesses say NS2 will slash their energy costs. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that “geostrategically, Europe cannot have an interest in cutting off all relations with Russia”. In 2017 she said that “the times in which we could completely depend on [the US and Britain] are, to a certain extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” With the relative decline of the US and Britain’s pending departure from the EU, Germany either sees an opportunity to become dominant or the need to find more reliable allies. It may see an alliance with Russia as an extension of European imperialism, and as a replacement for Britain, which itself has reportedly sought to spread misinformation in Europe in an attempt to weaken relations between Germany and Russia.[527] Turkey too, a long time client state of the US, appears to be forming a new alliance with Russia and Germany. In June 2019, the EU and Russia started talks on transitioning to using the rouble and euro in bilateral payments instead of the US dollar. China and Turkey are also investing heavily in the euro. The US is gradually being isolated and the grip on the world economy that the dollar as the world currency anchor gives the US is slipping. In the same week, it emerged that the US had been stepping up its ability to wage a cyberwar on Russia’s power grid, something it had deployed against Venezuela several times, depriving hospitals, factories and residential areas of electricity, earlier in the year. These cyber attacks are acts of war by the US’s own definition. A similar situation is developing with regards to Iran.[528] When Trump pulled the US out of the 2013 Iran nuclear deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions, Germany, France and even, to the chagrin of the US, Britain – all desperate for outlets for profitable investment – denounced the move and vowed to find ways to circumvent the US ban on trading with Iran, which applies to third parties. In July Russia expressed interest in the EU’s proposed Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, backing Iran’s demand that it would have to include the oil trade. Significantly, this would see the EU violating US sanctions on two fronts. Trump claims he is trying to stop a nuclear arms race in the Middle East but he is really motivated by competition. In March 2019, Miguel Berger, the Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, complained that, while everyone else was banned from trading with Iran, US trade with Iran in 2018 had in fact doubled. The US says it wants a new deal that curbs Iran’s ballistic missile programme and ends Iran’s supposed influence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the latter in which it is accused of backing the anti-imperialist Houthi movement. But it also wants to control Iran’s oil. The US’s increasingly belligerent client-states Israel and Saudi Arabia see Iran as a threat to their regional dominance and welcomed Trump’s move. [529] In May 2019 Trump warned Iran of “severe consequences” as the US, joined by Britain, began to build up naval and air power in the Persian Gulf. Fears of military conflict grew after Trump blamed Iran for Houthi attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. While Britain – which, in a blatant act of piracy at the request of the US, later seized an Iranian oil tanker bound for Syria – sided with the US, the EU demanded an independent inquiry. Japan, which had a tanker involved in the controversy, also questioned the veracity of the US’s account. The same week, Iran shot down a US drone. Trump claimed that he called off a retaliatory airstrike at the last minute, instead imposing further suffocating sanctions and launching a cyberattack on Iran’s defence infrastructure. Sanctions have resulted in inflation in Iran of 40% and the IMF predicted a 6% contraction in its economy. Iran said it would have to develop its uranium enrichment levels if Europe did not do more shield Iran from sanctions.[530] Iran could be the spark that ignites conflict between the US and Europe.[531] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s US-UK-backed war on Yemen has resulted, after four years, in what the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; and rising tensions between India and Pakistan at the beginning of 2019 threaten to spill over into a full-scale war, with the US generally backing the former and China the latter. Pakistan has taken out billions of dollars in loans from China in recent years as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious trade and infrastructure network connecting China to Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions. China has pledged to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, which has been bailed out by high- interest IMF loans some 14 times since 1980. The task of communists As we have said, Leninists have long predicted that these deepening splits would emerge. They have been proven correct, and the defeatist pseudo-Marxist theories of ‘ultra-imperialism’ – that the imperialist powers in fact form an unshakeable alliance – have been proven wrong. Existing divisions in NATO have been widening since the election of Trump, who has been unsurprisingly delighted by Brexit and its destabilising effect on the EU. Denouncing the EU’s “treatment” of Britain in the negotiations, Trump said at the start of April 2019 that “the EU is likewise a brutal trading partner with the US, which will change”. On 9 April he said the US planned to impose tariffs of $11bn (£8.4bn) on EU goods, partly because “EU subsidies to Airbus have adversely impacted the US”.[532] He must have known what was coming: on 10 April the EU and China announced a very significant trade deal in which they vowed, in a thinly veiled rebuke to the US, “to fight against unilateralism and protectionism”. China and Germany are now engaged in concrete military co-operation, with China deploying armoured vehicles on German soil for joint drills on 11 July, something that has been unthinkable until now.[533] At the same time, the potential for realignment with the US is also contained within the German approach. For example, the nation is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, escalating tensions with China and easing them with the US. As Trump is so fond of saying, “all options are on the table”. France has vowed to retaliate tit-for-tat against US sanctions. In Tony Kennedy’s foreword to the abridged 1992 English reprint of Grossman’s book, he says: “For Grossman, re-presenting Marx’s theory was no mere academic exercise. Nor was he concerned merely with describing tendencies towards periodic economic crises, of a more or less restricted character, nor even with trends towards more systematic and global recessions. He aimed to show that the essence of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society was the identification of the inexorable tendency towards breakdown as the fundamental characteristic of the social system as a whole.... Grossman contended that the socialist movement’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalism required theoretical proof of the system’s tendency towards breakdown.” This is now the task facing communists today. The first appeal that the Communist International made in 1920 to the international working class was to “Remember the imperialist war!”, warning that the repetition of such destructive wars, when the workers of different countries are coerced by the ruling classes to “cut each other’s throats” is not only possible but inevitable if capitalism is not overthrown.[536] The First World War confirmed what was written in the statutes of the First International, that the emancipation of the working class is not a local, nor a national, but an international question. And given that national bourgeoisies are inevitably pitted against each other in a world war, it follows that the only class that is capable of solidarity internationally is the working class. Nation-states will either respond to the looming crash as it deepens by cutting military expenditure drastically or waging war in a bid to offset economic losses – or perhaps by doing both. We are being haunted by the failure to turn the breakdowns that precipitated the first two world wars into the world revolution that Lenin expected to follow on the heels of the one he led in Russia. Only world socialism can ensure humanity’s survival.

#### **Capitalist crises fuel the rise of fascism---hypernationalism greatly increases the odds of conflict**

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In the broader picture, fascism, whether in its 20th- or 21st-century variant, is a particular, far right response to capitalist crisis, such as that of the 1930s and the one that began with the financial meltdown of 2008 and has now been greatly intensified by the pandemic. Trumpism in the United States; Brexit in the United Kingdom; the increasing influence of neo-fascist and authoritarian parties and movements throughout Europe (including Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium and Greece), and around the world (such as in Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil and India), represent just such a far-right response to the crisis. Trumpism and Fascism The telltale signs of the fascist threat in the United States are in plain sight. Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party. Trump proved to be a charismatic figure able to galvanize and embolden disparate neo-fascist forces, from white supremacists, white nationalists, militia, neo-Nazis and Klansmen, to the Oath Keepers, the Patriot Movement, Christian fundamentalists, and anti-immigrant vigilante groups. Since 2016, numerous other groups have emerged, from the Proud Boys and QAnon to the Boogaloo movement (whose explicit goal is to spark a civil war) and the terrorist Michigan group known as Wolverine Watchmen. They are heavily armed and mobilizing for confrontation in near-perfect consort with the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, which long since has captured that party and turned it into one of utter reaction. Encouraged by Trump’s imperial bravado, his populist and nationalist rhetoric, and his openly racist discourse, predicated in part on whipping up anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Black sentiment, they began to cross-pollinate to a degree not seen in decades as they gained a toehold in the Trump White House and in state and local governments around the country. Paramilitarism spread within many of these organizations and overlapped with state repressive agencies. Racist, far right and fascist militia, identified by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat, [operate inside law enforcement agencies](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law). As far back as 2006, a [government intelligence assessment](http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf) had warned of “white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement by organized groups and by self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes.” The fascist insurgency reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the mass protests sparked by the police-perpetrated murder of George Floyd in May. Among recent incidents too numerous to list, fascist militia members have routinely showed up heavily armed at anti-racist rallies to threaten protesters, and in several instances, have carried out assassinations. Trump has refused to condemn the armed right-wing insurgency. To the contrary, he [defended a self-described vigilante and “Blue Lives Matter” enthusiast](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/08/31/908137377/trump-defends-kenosha-shooting-suspect) who shot to death two unarmed protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25. On September 3, federal marshals carried out an extra-judicial execution of [Michael Reinoehl](https://truthout.org/articles/trump-appears-to-admit-extrajudicial-killing-of-michael-reinoehl-was-planned/), who admitted to shooting a few days earlier a member of the white supremacist group Patriot Prayer during a confrontation between Trump supporters and counterprotesters in Portland, Oregon. “There has to be [retribution](https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portland-shooting),” declared Trump in a chilling interview in which he seemed to take credit for what amounted to a death squad execution. Particularly ominous was the plot by a domestic terrorist militia group, broken up on October 8, to storm the Michigan state capitol to kidnap and possibly kill the Democratic governor of Michigan and other officials, a conspiracy that the White House refused to condemn. While there are great differences between [20th- and 21st-century fascism](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf) and any parallels should not be exaggerated, we would do well to recall the 1923 [“beer hall putsch”](https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch/The-Munich-Putsch) in Bavaria, Germany, which marked a turning point in the Nazis’ rise to power. In that incident, Hitler and a heavily armed group of his followers hatched a plot to kidnap leaders of the Bavarian government. Loyal government officials put down the putsch and jailed Hitler but the fascist insurgency expanded in its aftermath. The fascist putsch now hinges on the November election. The rule of law is breaking down. Trump has claimed, without any credible evidence, that the vote will be fraudulent, has refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, and has all but called on his supporters to be prepared for an insurrection. Himself a [transnational capitalist](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/TheTransnationalCapitalistClass.pdf), a racist and a fascist, Trump took advantage of the protests over the murder of George Floyd to bring the project to a new level, inciting from the White House itself the fascist mobilization in U.S. civil society, manipulating fear and a racist backlash with his “law and order” discourse, and threatening a qualitative escalation of the police state. Widespread and systematic voter suppression, especially of those from marginalized communities, has already [disenfranchised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/americans-voting-rights-disenfranchisement) millions. Donald Trump Jr. [called in September for](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-jr-video-2020-election-ballot-fraud-b605186.html) “every able-bodied man and woman to join an army for Trump’s election security operation.” Morphology of the Fascist Project The current crisis of global capitalism is both structural and political. Politically, capitalist states face spiraling crises of legitimacy after decades of hardship and social decay wrought by neoliberalism, aggravated now by these states’ inability to manage the health emergency and the economic collapse. The level of global social polarization and [inequality is unprecedented](https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf). The richest 1 percent of humanity control more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent of this wealth. Such extreme inequalities can only be sustained by extreme levels of state and private violence that lend themselves to fascist political projects. Structurally, the global economy is mired in a crisis of overaccumulation, or chronic stagnation, made much worse by the pandemic. As inequalities escalate, the system churns out more and more wealth that the mass of working people cannot actually consume. As a result, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The transnational capitalist class cannot find outlets to “unload” the trillions of dollars it has accumulated. In recent years, it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to militarized accumulation or accumulation by repression. This refers to how accumulation of capital comes increasingly to rely on transnational systems of social control, repression and warfare, as [the global police state](https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341644/the-global-police-state/) expands to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below. Fascism seeks to rescue capitalism from this organic crisis; that is, to violently restore capital accumulation, establish new forms of state legitimacy and suppress threats from below unencumbered by democratic constraints. The project involves a fusion of repressive and reactionary state power with a fascist mobilization in civil society. Twenty-first-century fascism, like its 20th-century predecessor, is a violently toxic mix of reactionary nationalism and racism. Its discursive and ideological repertoire involves extreme nationalism and the promise of national regeneration, xenophobia, doctrines of race/culture supremacy alongside a violent racist mobilization, martial masculinity, militarization of civic and political life, and the normalization — even glorification — of war, social violence and domination. As with its 20th-century predecessor, the 21st-century fascist project hinges on the psychosocial mechanism of dispersing mass fear and anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis toward scapegoated communities, whether Jews in Nazi Germany, immigrants in the United States, or Muslims and lower castes in India, and also on to an external enemy, such as communism during the Cold War, or China and Russia currently. It seeks to organize a mass social base with the promise to restore stability and security to those destabilized by capitalist crises. Fascist organizers appeal to the same social base of those millions who have been devastated by neoliberal austerity, impoverishment, precarious employment and relegation to the ranks of surplus labor, all greatly aggravated by the pandemic. As popular discontent has spread, far right and neo-fascist mobilization play a critical role in the effort by dominant groups to channel this discontent away from a critique of global capitalism and toward support for the transnational capitalist class agenda dressed in populist rhetoric. The fascist appeal is directed in particular to historically privileged sectors of the global working class, such as white workers in the Global North and urban middle layers in the Global South, that are experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility and socioeconomic destabilization. The flip side of targeting certain disaffected sectors is the violent control and suppression of other sectors — which, in the United States, come disproportionately from the ranks of surplus labor, communities that face racial and ethnic oppression, or religious and other forms of persecution. The mechanisms of coercive exclusion include mass incarceration and the spread of prison-industrial complexes; anti-immigrant legislation and deportation regimes; the manipulation of space in new ways so that both gated communities and ghettos are controlled by armies of private security guards and technologically advanced surveillance systems; ubiquitous, often paramilitarized policing; “non-lethal” crowd control methods; and mobilization of the culture industries and state ideological apparatuses to dehumanize victims of global capitalism as dangerous, depraved and culturally degenerate. Racism and Competing Interpretations of the Crisis We cannot under-emphasize the role of racism for the fascist mobilization in the United States. But we need to deepen our analysis of it. The U.S. political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. This has involved the breakdown of the white racist historic bloc that to one extent or another reigned supreme from the end of post-Civil War reconstruction to the late 20th century but has become destabilized through capitalist globalization. The far right and neo-fascists are attempting to reconstruct such a bloc, in which “national” identity becomes “white identity” as a stand-in (that is, a code) for a racist mobilization against perceived sources of anxiety and insecurity. Yet many white members of the working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future and accelerated precariatization — that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working-class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition. Racism and the appeal to fascism offer workers from the dominant racial or ethnic group an imaginary solution to real contradictions; recognition of the existence of suffering and oppression, even though its solution is a false one. The parties and movements associated with such projects have put forth a racist discourse, less coded and less mediated than that of mainstream politicians, targeting the racially oppressed, ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants and refugees in particular as scapegoats. Yet in this age of globalized capitalism, there is little possibility in the United States or elsewhere of providing such benefits, so that the “wages of fascism” now appear to be entirely psychological. The ideology of 21st-century fascism rests on irrationality — a promise to deliver security and restore stability that is emotive, not rational. It is a project that does not and need not distinguish between the truth and the lie. The Trump regime’s public discourse of populism and nationalism, for example, bears no relation to its actual policies. Trumponomics involves a sweeping deregulation of capital, slashing social spending, dismantling what remains of the welfare state, privatization, tax breaks to corporations and the rich, anti-worker laws, and an expansion of state subsidies to capital — in short, radical neoliberalism. Trump’s populism has no policy substance. It is almost entirely symbolic — hence the significance of his fanatical “build the wall” and similar rhetoric, symbolically essential to sustain a social base for which the state can provide little or no material bribe. This also helps to explain the increasing desperation in Trump’s bravado as the election approaches. But here is the clincher: Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising insecurity do not automatically lead to racist or fascist backlash. A racist/fascist interpretation of these conditions must be mediated by political agents and state agencies. Trumpism represents just such a mediation. To beat back the threat of fascism, popular resistance forces must put forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, involving a social justice agenda founded on a working-class politics that can win over the would-be social base of fascism. This would-be base is made up of a majority of workers who are experiencing the same deleterious effects of global capitalism in crisis as the entire working class. We need a social justice and working-class agenda to respond to its increasingly immiserated condition, lest we leave it susceptible to a far right populist manipulation of this condition. Joe Biden may well win the election. Yet even if he does so and manages to take office, the crisis of global capitalism and the fascist project it is stoking will continue. A united front against fascism must be based on a social justice agenda that targets capitalism and its crisis.

### 1AC---Innovation

#### Advantage 2 is Innovation:

#### **DPS unleashes faster and better aligned innovation than either capitalism or state socialism**

Kotz 2 - economics professor at Amherst (David, <https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Soc_and_Innovation_02.pdf>, emuse) \*DPPS = DPS

3. Capitalist Innovation Mainstream Western economics gives capitalism high marks for innovation. The pursuit of profit is supposed to assure a strong incentive to engage in the invention, development, and production stages of innovation, while also inducing investors to provide potential innovators with the necessary financial means. Free entry into markets compels rapid diffusion of innovations. An optimal contribution to human welfare is assured, given the assumption that profitability reflects the ultimate value to society of any economic activity. While capitalism does promote a certain kind of rapid technological change, the above account has serious flaws. The pursuit of profit does not play such a big role at the important invention stage of innovation. Studies show that a large majority of economically important inventions come from university scientists, government researchers, and independent inventors, for whom pecuniary considerations are not typically dominant.6 At the development stage, the still-high risks, plus the sometimes substantial external (and hence uncapturable) benefits from innovation, lead to (successful) demands for government subsidization.7 The profit incentive for innovation is profoundly contradictory. For the profit incentive to operate, innovators must be able to gain monopoly control over the innovation and bar competitors, or else the first innovator’s profit will be small and fleeting. However, the legal and extra-legal means that capitalist innovators use to gain such monopoly power (patents and predatory tactics) prevent the rapid diffusion of new products and processes. The greatest flaw in the capitalist innovation process has to do with the third question, that of the contribution of innovative activity to human welfare. As capitalist innovators follow the guide of profits, the following problems arise: 1) innovations are disproportionally directed at upper income consumers;8 2) public goods are largely ignored in the innovation process; 3) external benefits and costs of innovation, which may loom very large, are not taken into account in innovation decisions; 4) the monopoly power required to stimulate innovation leads to high monopoly prices for the resulting product, limiting the use of the new innovation and hence reducing the benefit from it;9 5) much innovation activity is pure waste, as firms devote innovation resources toward the end of defeating rivals rather than benefitting consumers.10 While capitalism does promote the development of the forces of production, it does so in a manner that is severely flawed. Capitalism can promote innovation only if the state and other non-capitalist institutions play an active role in organizing and financing the innovation process, particularly the invention stage. It can do so only with significant monopoly power and barriers to entry that simultaneously promote and hinder technical progress. And it produces a severely distorted innovation process that, after a certain stage of development, may subtract as much from human welfare as it contributes, or even more. 4. Innovation under Soviet State Socialism The Soviet system was, at best, a highly flawed and distorted version of socialism. However, it was the first large-scale effort to build a modern economy based on public ownership of productive property and coordination of the economy by economic planning. For this reason, the experience of the Soviet economy in the area of innovation is relevant to our concerns here Spokespeople for the Soviet system claimed that, as a socialist system, it would, and did, outperform capitalism in promoting technical progress. The key advantages cited were the absence of commercial secrecy, the avoidance of the wasteful duplication of R&D effort of capitalism, and the ability to directly incorporate technological advances into the central plan rather than having to rely on the indirect incentive of profitability. However, the Soviet leadership soon discovered that innovation was not as straightforward a process as had been assumed. In the postwar decades the system was frequently adjusted and reformed to improve innovation performance. The mature Soviet system had various institutional components to its innovation system, including the incorporation of major planned new technologies into the central plan by Gosplan each year. However, two institutions were most important in Soviet innovation performance: 1) a system of R&D Institutes, which had innovation as their sole mission; and 2) the individual enterprises, which typically had a design department for new product development and, at larger enterprises, a research laboratory. The Soviet system did have significant strengths in innovation performance.11 Soviet R&D Institutes were staffed with well-trained and dedicated researchers and were reasonably well funded, and they and the enterprises did produce many important innovations. The success was best known in military and space technology, but it extended to some civilian industrial technologies.12 Output per labor hour in the Soviet economy grew rapidly until 1975, much faster than in the U.S. during that period (Kotz and Weir, 1997, p. 46). However, Soviet innovation performance never lived up to expectations. Understanding the problems encountered in the Soviet innovation process -- and the institutional sources of those problems -- is relevant to evaluating the potential innovation performance of a DPPS system, including potential problems that it might encounter. There was a serious incentive problem in the Soviet innovation process. The incentive problem was not located at the R&D Institutes but rather at the enterprises. Soviet enterprises were relatively good at minor innovations. The incentive problem involved larger changes in the production process and the development of new products that differed substantially from what had been produced before. The Soviet enterprise director faced a context of relatively low rewards (in the director’s bonus) for successful innovations while the risks attendant upon major innovations were quite high. This tended to make Soviet enterprise directors conservative about innovation, with reluctance to develop new products or processes or to introduce those that emerged from the R&D Institutes. The risk of innovation was not just the result of the inevitable delays and unforseen costs that arise when trying something new. The key factor was the difficult supply relations in the Soviet planning system. Enterprises always worried about whether sufficient supplies would be delivered on time to enable the enterprise to meet its goals. This was a result of the policy of “taut planning,” aimed at achieving the maximum possible output from available inputs. Innovation necessitates unforeseen changes in required inputs, and the taut planning system made it difficult to change the input mix in mid-plan. The hierarchical relations of Soviet planning meant that enterprises did not have close relations with their suppliers, which compounded the problem. These conditions made innovation very risky, with a likelihood of interruption of the enterprise’s regular production, resulting in financial punishment for the director. Another incentive problem was an absence of penalties for failure to introduce available new technologies. A laggard enterprise with outmoded technology might find its costs rising above the industry average, but the ministry tended to protect its enterprises and made subsidies available. There were also problems of the means available for innovation. Innovations that involve radically new products typically entail either the entry by an existing enterprise into a new line of production or the creation of new enterprises. The Soviet planning system had relatively rigid boundaries between industries, and entry into a different line by an existing enterprise was discouraged, as poaching on the territory of others.13 While new enterprises were created from time to time, this was limited and usually faced opposition from existing enterprises. Individual inventors were greatly underutilized in the Soviet system. Most enterprises had an official policy of making small-scale facilities available to aspiring inventors. However, this program was not very effective at drawing out creative individual inventors, perhaps because the passivity bred into individuals by the repressive, centralized, hierarchical Soviet system discouraged individual inventive activity. In the matter of the effectiveness of innovative activity at advancing human welfare, the Soviet system did avoid some of the problems of capitalist innovation. There was no bias against innovation in public goods. There was no problem of monopoly pricing of new products and processes, with the attendant limitation of their use. However, the Soviet system had significant weaknesses in the effectiveness of innovative activity. We will cite three problems in this area. First, while irrational profit criteria largely guide the allocation of innovative effort in a capitalist system, in the Soviet system the “planners’ preference” guided this allocation. The top leadership favored certain sectors, particularly the military, space exploration, and certain industrial sectors, while consumer goods occupied a lowly place in their priorities. Second, there was a problem stemming from the poor relations between the two key institutions involved in innovation, the R&D Institutes and the enterprises. The R&D Institutes had the best researchers and facilities, and they produced a large volume of plans for new products and processes. However, the enterprises, which had to produce the new product or introduce the new process, complained that plans arrived that were incomplete, unrealistic, or unworkable. R&D Institutes complained that enterprises were uninterested in their proposals. The result was that much innovative effort failed to bear fruit. This seemed to be a result of the hierarchical character of the system, in which relations between institutions at the same level of the hierarchy were very poorly structured.14 Third, and perhaps most serious, innovation in the Soviet system generated major external costs, particularly for workplace and environmental health. The reason for this in the Soviet case was not the pursuit of profit but the single-minded emphasis on growth in output and the undemocratic and repressive character of the system which prevented the affected parties from defending their health interests. 5. Innovation in a Democratic Planned Participatory Socialist System What kind of innovation performance would be expected under a DPPS system, by comparison to that of capitalism and state socialism? Three features of DPPS, as laid out in Devine (1988), are relevant to innovation performance. First, the main features of the overall economic plan would be determined by a democratic process (Devine, 1988, p. 190). Second, the planning and coordination of the economy would take place, not through market forces or top-down central planning, but through a process of “negotiated coordination” (Devine, 1988, ch. 8-10). This means that resource allocation decisions would be made by boards -- industry boards and local and regional negotiated coordination bodies -- that have representation of all affected constituencies, including workers, consumers, suppliers, the local community, and even “cause” groups such as environmentalists, job safety activists, feminists, etc. These bodies would arrive at decisions through compromise among the interests represented on them. In addition, the basic units of social production, or enterprises, are considered social property and have governing boards that include representatives of all groups affected by the activity of the enterprise, including workers, consumers, suppliers, and the local community. Third, each individual would be expected to spend part of her/his work life in each of the main types of labor, which Devine defines as planning and managing labor, creative labor, nurturing labor, skilled labor, and unskilled/repetitive labor (Devine, 1988, 171). This would eliminate the social division of labor, while preserving the technical division of labor with its efficiency advantages In the absence of competitive pursuit of profits, or a Politburo demanding innovation, what would be the source of innovation under DPPS? First, the democratic, participatory institutions of that system would empower the population to demand innovations aimed at its own benefit. Under such a system, people would stand to benefit from innovation, in the three roles that people occupy – that of consumer, worker, and community member. Consumers can benefit from new, better, and cheaper products. Workers can benefit from less arduous toil and a more satisfying experience at work. Members of the community can benefit from products and work processes that improve, rather than harm, community life. DPPS, like every economic system, can also tap a second potential source of innovation. That is the species trait of human beings of having a propensity to look for ways to change and improve their methods of doing things, entirely apart from any desire for more goods or less labor. This drive, present in most people, although not in equal measure in all, represents an important source of innovative behavior at the stage of invention, if the economic system allows it to operate freely. How would a DPPS economy translate the potential benefits of innovation into actual effective innovative activity? How would it encourage, within the economy, the expression of human beings’ natural tendency to create new things? If the populace wants innovation, they would have to build into the system significant incentives for those who are in a position to carry it out. Enterprise managers, along with everyone else who participates in any of the stages of innovation, should be eligible for rewards for successful innovation. It is not sufficient to assume that decision-makers will automatically innovate -- it must be communicated to them, via a reward system, that society values innovation. Such rewards would be needed regardless of the mix of material versus moral incentives. Pay incentives need not be huge to elicit innovative behavior, as long they are large enough to bring a noticeable consumption benefit to the innovator. As the Soviet experience indicates, a planned economy can increase the risk associated with innovation, deterring innovative activity. However, DPPS should not suffer from the problems of uncertain supplies and inflexibility that characterized Soviet planning. With representatives on one another’s decision-making boards and with opportunities to communicate on negotiated coordination bodies, there should be reliable and flexible relations between suppliers and customers. It would be necessary to eschew the Soviet policy of taut planning and operate the economy with sufficient excess productive capacity to accommodate the unforeseen changes in inputs that innovation requires. Without the spur of competition to compel laggard enterprises to adopt the best technology in the industry, could an enterprise management, perhaps backed up by a workforce unenthusiastic about change, simply refuse to make improvements? As was noted above, an enterprise under DPPS is not the sole property of its workers but is social property, upon which constituencies outside the enterprise have a legitimate claim. Industry boards would have to keep track of laggard enterprises, and consumer representatives on both industry and enterprise boards would have to be powerful enough to exert pressure to make appropriate changes, imposing financial penalties where necessary. In order for this system to work effectively, it would be desirable to have more than one enterprise in each industry, except in cases of natural monopoly.15 The purpose is not to impose a market form of competition in which the cheapest producer drives out the rest, a process which often yields socially irrational outcomes. Rather, the purpose is to permit the gathering of comparative information about enterprise performance, from market exchange as well as other sources, so as to make informed decisions about what changes enterprises should be asked to make. It would not always turn out that the higher-cost producer is the one asked to change; the lower-cost producer might be found to have achieved low costs by anti-social practices rather than superior technology. Long ago Adam Smith complained that the detailed division of labor tends to make workers stupid. The DPPS practice of assuring everyone participation in the highest types of labor should have the opposite effect. This practice, along with the widespread participation in decision-making fostered by a DPPS society, should encourage the creative, innovative behavior that is natural to our species. DPPS should create conditions for a substantial outpouring of creativity from the population, some of which would take the form of innovation in the economic sphere. In the matter of assuring adequate means for innovation, DPPS would face a serious problem. The basic institutions of DPPS would not necessarily provide sufficient opportunities for creative individuals to work out new economically relevant ideas. More generally, there would be a danger that the decision-making boards of DPPS would tend to represent existing ways of doing things and offer resistance to innovation. The citizens of a DPPS society could solve this problem by establishing an Innovation Facilitation Board (IFB), dedicated to the promotion of innovation throughout the economy.16 The IFB would be given substantial financing from the central treasury. It would take applications from enterprises, informal groups, or individuals that wanted to work on inventing a new product or process or to engage in the development stage of an innovation. It would be able to make grants covering a long enough time period to provide a chance of success. Determining the membership of the IFB represents a serious problem for DPPS. If the IFB included representatives of all the constituencies that are affected by innovation, this would be likely to subvert its intended function. Major innovations typically have victims, and the potential costs may be more apparent than the potential benefits when the innovation is still at an early stage.17 A simple application of the principle of wide representation might block the development of new products and processes before their potential benefits became apparent. In order to be capable of carrying out its mandate, the IFB would have to be constituted as an independent board, perhaps made up of consumer representatives and experts of various kinds. Such a departure from the usual practice would be consistent with the underlying principle of DPPS, as long as the final decision to implement an innovation rested with a representative board. The IFB would facilitate and encourage the invention and development stages for new products and processes. It seems justified to protect the early stages of innovation from a final social decision, until it has been developed to the point where a well-informed judgment can be made about benefits and costs. However, the decision to implement an innovation should have to pass the test of the system’s core process of evaluation by, and compromise among, all affected constituencies. This calls for a second institution, an Innovation Approval Board (IAB). It would be constituted in the usual way, with representation of all relevant interests. Its role would be to determine whether a proposed new product or process, which emerged from a grant from the IFB, should be given the green light for production/introduction. While contemporary capitalism does place some after-the-fact restraints on socially harmful innovation, through state regulation and individual or class-action lawsuits, DPPS would place social interests at the heart of the innovation process. While the research and development stages of a potentially harmful project could not be readily blocked by opponents, the project could not be implemented, and the costs actually imposed, without social approval. Furthermore, those engaging in invention or development on an IFB grant would know the criteria by which the implementation of the innovation would eventually be judged by the IAB, which should have a positive impact on the direction of invention and development. A remaining problem is the possible need to allow an existing enterprise to enter a new line of production, or to permit the founding of a new enterprise, in order to implement a major innovation. This might encounter resistence from existing interests. To avoid this problem, once the IAB has given its approval, the innovators should have the right to request permission to start a new enterprise, or enlist an existing enterprise to move outside its previous line of work, in order to implement the innovation. A decision to grant such a request might require a joint meeting of the IFB and the IAB. The social effectiveness of innovation under DPPS should be free of each of the five problems of capitalist innovation cited above. Innovation would not be directed disproportionately to satisfy the rich, since there would be no rich class, nor would profits from sale guide innovation. The balance between innovation in public and private goods should reflect the citizenry’s priorities, since representative bodies would allocate innovation resources between the two types of goods, and the incentives for innovation should operate equally for the two. External benefits and costs, including those affecting workers and the environment, should be fully considered by the representative boards that make decisions about the introduction of new technologies and products. Such decisions would not face the pressure to impose costs on third parties that results from competitive profit-seeking. There would be no problem of monopoly pricing restricting the application of innovations and no waste of innovative effort due to oligopolistic competition. The three problems that undermined the effectiveness of innovation under state socialist planning should be absent from DPPS. No Politburo officials would dictate priorities for innovation. Instead, democratic decision-making would determine the amount and allocation of innovation. The waste-generating disconnection between R&D Institutes and enterprises should not be present in DPPS, since horizontal relations among institutions would be strong. If R&D Institutes were designed as part of the innovation system of DPPS, then cross representation between them and the enterprises should permit an effective interface between the two types of institutions. Last, the causes of the severe external costs of innovation under state socialism – a single-minded focus on growth of output and a lack of democracy – should not characterize DPPS. Our conclusion is that the basic defining institutions of DPPS are generally favorable for innovation, but these institutions alone would not be sufficient to guarantee successful innovation performance. By adding the set of additional institutions and policies mentioned above, DPPS should display an innovation performance far superior at meeting human needs to that of either capitalism or state socialism. Of course, such a system would not guarantee that every innovation would contribute to human welfare. It is not always possible to predict in advance what the eventual consequences of a new product or process will be. However, such a system would be far superior to earlier systems at making such decisions.

#### An innovation process centered on social interests is key to avert extinction from black-ball technology

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Achieving stabilization The truth of VWH would be bad news. But it would not imply that civilization will be devastated. In principle at least, there are several responses that could stabilize the world even if vulnerability exists. Recall that we defined the hypothesis in terms of a black-ball technology making civilizational devastation extremely likely conditional on technological development continuing and the semi-anarchic default condition persisting. Thus we can theoretically consider the following possibilities for achieving stabilization: 1. Restrict technological development. 2. Ensure that there does not exist a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. 3. Establish extremely effective preventive policing. 4. Establish effective global governance. We will discuss (3) and (4) in subsequent sections. Here we consider (1) and (2). We will argue they hold only limited promise as ways of protecting against potential civilizational vulnerabilities. Technological relinquishment In its general form, technological relinquishment looks exceedingly unpromising. Recall that we construed the word ‘technology’ broadly; so that completely stopping technological development would require something close to a cessation of inventive activity everywhere in the world. That is hardly realistic; and if it could be done, it would be extremely costly – to the point of constituting an existential catastrophe in its own right (Namely, ‘permanent stagnation’ (Bostrom, 2013)). That general relinquishment of scientific and technological research is a non-starter does not, however, imply that limited curtailments of inventive activities could not be a good idea. It can make sense to forego particularly perilous directions of advancement. For instance, recalling our ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it would be sensible to discourage research into laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment (Kemp, 2012). Any technology that makes it possible to produce weapons-grade fissile material using less energy or with a smaller industrial footprint would erode important barriers to proliferation. It is hard to see how a slight reduction in the price of nuclear energy would compensate. On the contrary, the world would probably be better off if it somehow became harder and more expensive to enrich uranium. What we would ideally want in this area is not technological progress but technological regress. While targeted regress might not be in the cards, we could aim to slow the rate of advancement towards risk-increasing technologies relative to the rate of advancement in protective technologies. This is the idea expressed by the principle of differential technological development. In its original formulation, the principle focuses on existential risk; but we can apply it more broadly to also encompass technologies with ‘merely’ devastational potential: Principle of Differential Technological Development. [slow] the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies (Bostrom, 2002). The principle of differential technological development is compatible with plausible forms of technological determinism. For example, even if it were ordained that all technologies that can be developed will be developed, it can still matter when they are developed. The order in which they arrive can make an important difference – ideally, protective technologies should come before the destructive technologies against which they protect; or, if that is not possible, then it is desirable that the gap be minimized so that other countermeasures (or luck) may tide us over until robust protection become available. The timing of an invention also influences what sociopolitical context the technology is born into. For example, if we believe that there is a secular trend toward civilization becoming more capable of handling black balls, then we may want to delay the most risky technological developments, or at least abstain from accelerating them. Even if we suppose that civilizational devastation is unavoidable, many would prefer it to take place further into the future, at a time when maybe they and their loved ones are no longer alive anyway.32 Differential technological development doesn’t really make sense in the original urn-of-creativity model, where the color of each ball comes as a complete surprise. If we want to use the urn model in this context, we must modify it. We could stipulate, for example, that the balls have different textures and that there is a correlation between texture and color, so that we get clues about the color of a ball before we extract it. Another way to make the metaphor more realistic is to imagine that there are strings or elastic bands between some of the balls, so that when we pull on one of them we drag along several others to which it is linked. Presumably the urn is highly tubular, since certain technologies must emerge before others can be reached (we are not likely to find a society that uses jet planes and flint axes). The metaphor would also become more realistic if we imagine that there is not just one hand daintily exploring the urn: instead, picture a throng of scuffling prospectors reaching in their arms in hopes of gold and glory, and citations. Correctly implementing differential technological development is clearly a difficult strategic task (Cf. Collingridge, 1980). Nevertheless, for an actor who cares altruistically about long-term outcomes and who is involved in some inventive enterprise (e.g. as a researcher, funder, entrepreneur, regulator, or legislator) it is worth making the attempt. Some implications, at any rate, seem fairly obvious: for instance, don’t work on laser isotope separation, don’t work on bioweapons, and don’t develop forms of geoengineering that would empower random individuals to unilaterally make drastic alterations to the Earth’s climate. Think twice before accelerating enabling technologies – such as DNA synthesis machines – that would directly facilitate such ominous developments.33 But boost technologies that are predominantly protective; for instance, ones that enable more efficient monitoring of disease outbreaks or that make it easier to detect covert WMD programs. Even if it is the case that all possible ‘bad’ technologies are bound to be developed eventually, it can still be helpful to buy a little time.34 However, differential technological development does not on its own offer a solution for vulnerabilities that persist over long periods – ones where adequately protective technologies are much harder to develop than their destructive counterparts, or where destruction has the advantage even at technological maturity.35 Preference modification Another theoretically possible way of achieving civilizational stabilization would be to change the fact that there exists a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. We reserve for later discussion of interventions that would reduce the effective number of independent actors by increasing various forms of coordination. Here we consider the possibility of modifying the distribution of preferences (within a more or less constant population of actors). The degree to which this approach holds promise depends on which type of vulnerability we have in mind. In the case of a Type-1 vulnerability, preference modification does not look promising, at least in the absence of extremely effective means for doing so. Consider that some Type-1 vulnerabilities would result in civilizational devastation if there is even a single empowered person anywhere in the world who is motivated to pursue the destructive outcome. With that kind of vulnerability, reducing the number of people in the apocalyptic residual would do nothing to forestall devastation unless the number could be reduced all the way to zero, which may be completely infeasible. It is true that there are other possible Type-1 vulnerabilities that would require a somewhat larger apocalyptic residual in order for civilizational devastation to occur: for example, in a scenario like ‘easy nukes’, maybe there would have to be somebody from the apocalyptic residual in each of several hundred cities. But this is still a very low bar. It is difficult to imagine an intervention – short of radically re-engineering human nature on a fully global scale – that would sufficiently deplete the apocalyptic residual to entirely eliminate or even greatly reduce the threat of Type-1 vulnerabilities. Note that an intervention that halves the size of the apocalyptic residual would not (at least not through any firstorder effect) reduce the expected risk from Type-1 vulnerabilities by anywhere near as much. A reduction of 5 percent or 10 percent of Type-1 risk from halving the apocalyptic residual would be more plausible. The reason is that there is wide uncertainty about how destructive some new blackball technology would be, and we should arguably use a fairly uniform prior in log space (over several orders of magnitude) over the size of apocalyptic residual that would be required in order for civilizational devastation to occur conditional on a Type-1 vulnerability arising. In other words, conditional on some new technology being developed that makes it easy for an average individual to kill at least one million people, it may be (roughly) as likely that the technology would enable the average individual to kill one million people, ten million people, a hundred million people, a billion people, or every human alive. These considerations notwithstanding, preference modification could be helpful in scenarios in which the set of empowered actors is initially limited to some small definable subpopulation. Some black-ball technologies, when they first emerge from the urn, might be difficult to use and require specialized equipment. There could be a period of several years before such a technology has been perfected to the point where an average individual could master it. During this early period, the set of empowered actors could be quite limited; for example, it might consist exclusively of individuals with bioscience expertise working in a particular type of lab. Closer screening of applicants to positions in such labs could then make a meaningful dent in the risk that a destructive individual gains access to the biotech black ball within the first few years of its emergence.36 And that reprieve may offer an opportunity to introduce other countermeasures to provide more lasting stabilization, in anticipation of the time when the technology gets easy enough to use that it diffuses to a wider population. For Type-2a vulnerabilities, the set of empowered actors is much smaller. Typically what we are dealing with here are states, perhaps alongside a few especially powerful nonstate actors. In some Type-2a scenarios, the set might consist exclusively of two superpowers, or a handful of states with special capabilities (as is currently the case with nuclear weapons). It could thus be very helpful if the preferences of even a few powerful states were shifted in a more peaceloving direction. The ‘safe first strike’ scenario would be a lot less alarming if the actors facing the security dilemma had attitudes towards one another similar to those prevailing between Finland and Sweden. For many plausible sets of incentives that could arise for powerful actors as a consequence of some technological breakthrough, the prospects for a non-devastational outcome would be significantly brightened if the actors in question had more irenic dispositions. Although this seems difficult to achieve, it is not as difficult as persuading almost all the members in the apocalyptic residual to alter their dispositions. Lastly, consider Type-2b. Recall that such a vulnerability entails that ‘by default’ a great many actors face incentives to take some damaging action, such that the combined effects add up to civilizational devastation. The incentives for using the black-ball technology must therefore be ones that have a grip on a substantial fraction of the world population – economic gain being perhaps the prime example of such a near-universal motivation. So imagine some private action, available to almost every individual, which saves each person who takes it a fraction X of his or her annual income, while producing a negative externality such that if half the world’s population takes the action then civilization gets devastated. At X = 0, we can assume that few people would take the antisocial action. But the greater X is, the larger the fraction of the population that would succumb to temptation. Unfortunately, it is plausible that the value of X that would induce at least half of the population to take the action is small, perhaps less than 1 per cent.37 While it would be desirable to change the distribution of global preferences so as to make people more altruistic and raise the value of X, this seems difficult to achieve. (Consider the many strong forces already competing for hearts and minds – corporate advertisers, religious organizations, social movements, education systems, and so on.) Even a dramatic increase in the amount of altruism in the world – corresponding, let us say, to a doubling of X from 1 percent to 2 per cent – would prevent calamity only in a relatively narrow band of scenarios, namely those in which the private benefit of using the destructive technology is in the 1–2 per cent range. Scenarios in which the private gain exceeds 2 per cent would still result in civilizational devastation. In sum, modifying the distribution of preferences within the set of actors that would be destructively empowered by a black-ball discovery could be a useful adjunct to other means of stabilization, but it can be difficult to implement and would at best offer only very partial protection (unless we assume extreme forms of worldwide re-engineering of human nature).38 Some specific countermeasures and their limitations Beside influencing the direction of scientific and technological progress, or altering destruction-related preferences, there are a variety of other possible countermeasures that could mitigate a civilizational vulnerability. For example, one could try to: • prevent the dangerous information from spreading; • restrict access to requisite materials, instruments, and infrastructure; • deter potential evildoers by increasing the chance of their getting caught; • be more cautious and do more risk assessment work; and • establish some kind of surveillance and enforcement mechanism that would make it possible to interdict attempts to carry out a destructive act.

#### Black-ball technology causes extinction

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Full-scale nuclear war. There is roughly 0.02-7% chance per year of accidental full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia (Barrett, Baum, & Hostetler, 2013). With fairly high probabilities of nuclear winter and civilization collapse given nuclear war, this is order of magnitude 10% this century. We should also take into consideration that despite reductions in nuclear weapons, a new nuclear arms race is possible in the 21st century. Such a race may include more devastating weapons or cheaper manufacturing methods. Nuclear war could include the creation of large cobalt bombs as doomsday weapons or attacks on nuclear power plants. It could also start a chain of events which result in civilization collapse. Nanotechnology risks. Although molecular manufacturing can be achieved without self-replicating machines (Drexler & Phoenix, 2004), technological fascination with biological systems makes it likely that self-replicating machines will be created. Moreover, catastrophic uses of nanotechnology needn’t be due to accident, but also due to the actions of purposeful malignant agents. Therefore, we estimate the chance of runaway self-replicating machines causing “gray goo” and thus human extinction to be one per cent in this century. There could also be extinction risks from weapons produced by safe exponential molecular manufacturing. See also (Turchin, 2016). Artificial pandemic and other risks from synthetic biology. An artificial multipandemic is a situation in which multiple (even hundreds) of individual viruses created through synthetic biology are released simultaneously either by a terrorist state or as a result of the independent activity of biohackers (Turchin, Green, & Dekenbergern, 2017). Because the capacity to create such a multipandemic could arrive as early as within the next ten to thirty years (as all the needed technologies already exist), it could overshadow future risks, like nanotech and AI, so we give it a higher estimate. There are also other possible risks, connected with synthetic biology, which are widely recognized as serious (Bostrom, 2002). Agricultural catastrophe. There is about a one per cent risk per year of a ten per cent global agricultural shortfall occurring due to a large volcanic eruption, a medium asteroid or comet impact, regional nuclear war, abrupt climate change, or extreme weather causing multiple breadbasket failures (Denkenberger 2016). This could lead to 10% mortality. Red AI risks. The risks connected with the possible creation of non-aligned Strong AI are discussed by (Bostrom, 2014), (Yudkowsky, 2008), (Yampolskiy & Fox, 2013) and others. It is widely recognized as the most serious X risk. AI could start an “intelligence explosion wave” through the Universe, which could prevent appearance of the other civilizations before they create their own AI. Purple Something like the Caribbean crisis in the past, but larger size. Currently, there are no known purple risks. If we could be sure that Strong AI will appear in the next 100 years and would probably be negative, it would constitute a purple risk. Another example would be the creation of a Doomsday weapon that could kill our species with global radiation poisoning (much greater ionizing radiation release than all of the current nuclear weapons) (Kahn, 1959). A further example would be a large incoming asteroid being located, or an extinction level pandemic has begun. These situations require quick and urgent effort on all levels.

#### Capitalism locks in existential climate change---only socialism can achieve the absolute decoupling necessary to solve

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)

Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the [sole source of profit](http://gesd.free.fr/kliman99.pdf) — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of [alleged plummeting sperm counts](https://grossmanite.medium.com/declining-sperm-counts-polluted-breast-milk-autoimmune-disorders-the-diabolical-legacy-of-53462aa1245d) (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s ([now existential) economic crisis](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0) — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — [down from 81% in 2010](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-total-primary-energy-demand-by-fuel-2010-2019) — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, [according to S&P Global Platts Analytics](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062320-fossil-fuels-energy-mix-infographic-interactive). (Even 1C has already seen a reported [400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/public_health/Death-toll-from-climate-change-estimated-at-400000-In-2010.html); while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting [70 years sooner than previously expected](https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/canada-permafrost). While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants ([especially hemp](https://medium.com/@Grossmanite/the-green-new-deal-is-species-suicide-only-a-hemp-based-industrial-revolution-can-save-earths-f9c3dc29c4e3), which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and [mycelium](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-mycelium-revolution-is-upon-us/) (from which we can even make [computers](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsfs.2018.0029)). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp [quickly draw down and sequester CO2](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hemp-and-lots-of-it-could_b_328275?guccounter=1) while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that [outperform lithium and graphene](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28770876); and highly-insulating [carbon-negative hempcrete](https://www.ukhempcrete.com/services/better-than-zero-carbon-buildings/)) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found [huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deep-life-microbes-underground-bacteria-earth-surface-carbon-observatory-science-study-a8677521.html), despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and [produce electricity in the process](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/18may_wastenot.html). It is now thought that one day [microbial fuel cells](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ames/could-electricity-producing-bacteria-help-power-future-space-missions/) could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, [smashing the myth of The Individual](https://aeon.co/essays/science-and-metaphysics-must-work-together-to-answer-lifes-deepest-questions) — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is [the safest form of energy production](https://amp.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change). There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if [water can be ‘artificially’ produced](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071031125457.htm)). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that [will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0)). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway [becoming an economic necessity](https://fleetworld.co.uk/road-test-hyundai-i30/) for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

### 1AC---Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector in accordance with Democratically Planned Socialism.

### 1AC---Solvency

#### Solvency:

#### DPS is the optimal economic structure---avoids the challenges that accompanied the Soviet model

Kotz 8 - economics professor at Amherst (David, https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/What\_Ec\_Struc\_Soc\_08\_03.pdf, emuse)

The economic problems of actually existing socialism were not inherent in socialism, or in economic planning. They were structural problems of the particular form of planning that first arose in the Soviet Union and later appeared in other Communist Party ruled states. All of the economic problems listed in section 2 above were due to a key feature of that form of socialism: an absence of popular participation in decision-making in the economy and the state. There were various problematic policies, but the foregoing structural feature was the underlying source of the economic problems.5 Economic activity in any system will serve the needs of those who have power within that system. In a market economy ordinary consumers have a limited power -- they can decide not to purchase something. Hence, producers have be concerned with what ordinary consumers want to buy, since that is something they cannot fully control, try though they may. In Soviet-type planning, those actors with power were able to get high quality goods produced for them. No one ever claimed that Soviet weapons were of low quality, yet they were produced via the system of central planning. Soviet military leaders, and the ministers in charge of production of military equipment, were powerful and could demand high quality products. Similarly, some of the industrial ministers in civilian sectors had the power to demand high quality products, and some Soviet industrial products were world class.6 Special enterprises produced housing for high officials, and the quality of such housing was excellent.7 Powerful Soviet officials exercised their power by their ability to discipline or demote top enterprise officials if product quality was deemed unsatisfactory. It was an effective incentive. By contrast, ordinary households had almost no power in the Soviet planning system. Enterprise managers were not rewarded and punished based on how well they satisfied household consumers. The environmental damage from Soviet-type central planning resulted from an unaccountable leadership's focus on economic growth. The absence of democratic rights for the population prevented the emergence of a strong environmental movement that could have insisted on changed priorities. For economic planning to work effectively, power must be dispersed among all of the relevant groups in the economy, not monopolized by unaccountable high officials. Models of participatory planning have been elaborated by a number of authors (Devine, 1988, 2002; Albert and Hahnel, 1991). They involve democratic participation both in the economy and the state, which must be closely intertwined in a socialist system. These models share the following five principles: 1) wide participation in decision-making by those affected by a decision; 2) representation of the population as workers, community members, and consumers on decision-making bodies; 3) a decision-making process based on negotiation and compromise, to handle the inevitable existence of opposing interests among different groups; and 4) an equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of economic and political life. If consumer representatives sat on enterprise boards and on regional and national level planning bodies, they could insist that enterprises produce high quality consumer goods that people would like to purchase, with the power to set rewards and penalties to back up their demands. If the top political leaders are dependent on popular support for staying in office, they would be under pressure to make the system work to meet the needs of ordinary people. Democratic institutions, which in a capitalist system are always limited by the enormous political power of the rich, would work far better in a socialist system that has no class of wealthy property owners. The promise of getting rich is not necessary to build an efficient, innovative economy. "Innovation Institutes" could fund the testing out of new ideas, new products, and new services. Someone with a proposal for a new restaurant or service establishment could apply for funds and leasing rights to carry out their proposal, without departing from the principle of public ownership of productive property. Modest material rewards should be sufficient to encourage innovation and new and varied services, given the presence in any population of many individuals who are personally inclined to launch new projects. By providing representation for all constituencies in the making of allocation decisions, participatory planning would provide channels for all groups to see that their needs are addressed. It also recognizes the existence of conflicting interests even in a socialist society and provides institutions in which groups can negotiate and reach compromises. For example, enterprise boards having representatives of workers, consumers, and the community could strike a reasonable balance among workers' interest in not being overworked, consumers' interest in affordable and well-made products, and the community's interest in avoiding pollution of air and water. In a country having a relatively low living standard, a system of participatory planning would allow the population to demand a high rate of economic growth though democratic decisions about the resources to be devoted to investment and improved technologies. For participatory planning to work effectively, economic decisions should be as decentralized as possible to facilitate maximum participation by affected parties. Old-style central planning was overly centralized. Some economic decisions must be made at the center, but many can be made at a regional or local level. The claim that a system based on free markets is superior to any other in efficiency, innovation, and growth has no foundation. While a capitalist market economy can develop the forces of production and bring a rising level of material consumption for part of the population, history shows that it has been unable to build a society that meets the needs of the entire population. Only socialism can assure everyone material comfort, security, and a guaranteed opportunity to participate in productive labor, without some exploiting others. Only socialism can build a society based upon the better aspects of human nature, rather than its baser aspects, and finally enable people to become the real masters of their fate. But socialism can carry out this historic mission only if it embraces democracy and popular participation as the basis of its institutions.

#### American DPS goes global---serves as a shining city on a hill, removes obstacles, and offers assistance

PSL 8 (Party for Socialism and Liberation, [https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/#](https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/), emuse)

Experiences in socialist construction Thanks in great part to the practical experience of Lenin in making revolution, 21st-century socialists have a wealth of experience on which to base further conclusions. Marxists have been able to use accumulated theory and practice in order to lead revolutions in Russia, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Cuba and many other countries. While there have been vast differences in the experiences of those socialist revolutions, they share one common feature: The socialist revolutions of the 20th century took place in countries where the level of productive forces was very low compared to the imperialist countries. Every successful revolution faced the primary task of developing their economies—while under constant military threat by world imperialism. For that reason, Lenin described the challenges of building communism in 1920 in very practical terms: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” There was no hope in building socialism if the economy remained underdeveloped. Because of the combined challenges of developing the productive forces under the gun of world imperialism, no socialist revolution has yet reached a stage where the “withering away of the state” could be imagined. Imperialism has seized on any weakness in the revolutionary states in order to foment counterrevolution. Nevertheless, the working classes in the countries that have set out to build socialism have made tremendous gains. Russia’s working class in 1917 was 4 percent of the population. Within 50 years, it was the second-most powerful economy in the world. China had never been able to feed its entire population prior to the revolution. Millions died during famines in China prior to 1949. Yet after the 1949 revolution, for the first time the economy was able to feed the largest population in the world. Despite immense pressure from imperialism, Cuba has been able to achieve tremendous gains—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuban workers enjoy among the highest living standards of any of their counterparts in Latin America or much of the oppressed world. The continued military and economic dominance by world imperialism—first and foremost by U.S. imperialism—has made the transition to socialism that Marx and Lenin described so far impossible. The workers’ states have needed to devote a considerable part of their social development toward the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship—the army and police—in order to defend against invasion or counterrevolution. Taking that next step will require a society based on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the United States. Toppling the world’s dominant capitalist power would not only lift a tremendous burden from the workers around the world who are trying to engage in socialist construction. It would put at the disposal of the world working class the tremendous wealth produced by the U.S. working class. All the social wealth extracted from the oppressed world by U.S. corporations and mines could be used to reverse the effects of centuries of colonial and imperialist exploitation. A revolution in the United States would undercut the economic basis for divisions among the working class that promote racism, sexism and homophobia. Socialism is a system of peace, justice and equality. The road to socialism begins with revolution in the United States.

#### Proletarianization makes class struggle inevitable---the aff accelerates and properly directs movements

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

Those who are lucky enough to find or remain in work as the capitalist crisis deepens will see their pay and conditions savagely forced down. In April 2018, the World Bank recommended yet more deregulation in a report that said “high minimum wages, undue restrictions on hiring and firing and strict contract forms all make workers more expensive vis-à-vis technology”.[437] International capital is preparing a major assault on international labour in order to accelerate moves towards automation. Even if the next crash is not a final breakdown, significant sections of the middle classes would be proletarianised and impoverished and the reserve army of labour would swell. Class struggle would explode. Capitalists could be forced to slow down or stop the introduction of new automation by, say, a strong and militant neo-Luddite or trade union movement and – the usual driver for concessions – the desire for social peace. But the contradiction persists: capital accumulation, and staying ahead of or keeping up with competitors, requires higher productivity and therefore labour-saving innovation. The deeper capitalism sinks into crisis the more necessary it becomes to raise productivity. That is, the more workers are replaced by robots, the greater the underproduction of surplus value becomes, and yet the system will need to respond by replacing more workers with robots. If it cannot do this then capital goes unvalorised and the economy crashes. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, a strong neo-Luddite or trade union movement would sooner or later have to be crushed. In an article in January 2018 headlined “When the next recession hits, the robots will be ready”, the Washington Post pointed out that innovations happen quickest “when employers slash payrolls going into a downturn and, out of necessity, turn to software or machinery to take over the tasks once performed by their laid-off workers”.[438] Pointing to growing expectations by economists of a financial crisis in 2020, the paper adds that the “next wave of automation won’t just be sleek robotic arms on factory floors. It will be ordering kiosks, self- service apps and software smart enough to perfect schedules and cut down on the workers needed to cover a shift. Employers are already testing these systems. A recession will force them into the mainstream.” Striking statistics from an upcoming paper by economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu “found that 88% of job loss in routine occupations occurs within 12 months of a recession. In the 1990- 1991, 2001 and 2008-2009 recessions, routine jobs accounted for ‘essentially all’ of the jobs lost. They regained almost no ground during the subsequent recoveries.”[439] Automation under capitalism is therefore accelerating the trend towards proletarianisation, higher levels of poverty and the underproduction of surplus value. It is the sharpest of sharpening contradictions, a vicious circle from which capitalism cannot escape. It is a trend which increasingly threatens a final breakdown. The ‘Leninist’ road to socialism[440] – whereby working class organisations (soviets (workers’ councils), communes etc) effectively form an independent state and then, when strong enough, destroy what is left of the capitalist state – of course seems to be dismissed now more than ever – by liberals who claim that the demise of the Soviet Union signalled the end of history;[441] by the anarchists and autonomists who believe a leap into ‘full communism’ can be achieved without the socialist stage; and by ‘democratic socialists’ who claim socialism can be built via bourgeois democracy by voting through ‘socialist policies’. Then there is the notion that Marx and Lenin are redundant because the supposed protagonist of their revolutionary strategy – the industrial proletariat – is dead or irrelevant. There are several problems surrounding this. The accusation about the industrial proletariat is made, in slightly different ways, not just by liberals but by some anarchists, who do not claim that the industrial proletariat is dead but persist with the myth that it is the protagonist of the Leninist revolution. The Bolsheviks focused on agitating among the urban or industrial proletariat because that was the most efficient use of scarce resources, with the intention that the message would then spread outwards to the wider proletariat as a whole. This accusation that Leninists ignore the wider proletariat is often a projection of valid criticisms of some ‘Trotskyists’, who, while posing as Leninists, or at least distorting Leninism, do overemphasise the importance of the industrial worker. This is because Trotskyists – who for the same reason tend to be de facto pro-imperialist (by giving critical support to the Labour Party, for example) – tend to derive from labour aristocratic positions in trade unions and universities. Lenin though is renowned for criticising socialists who limited their agitation to “trade union consciousness” or “economism” – ie, simply supporting, or tailing, working class demands, without advocating an independent (non-social democratic) working class party or proletarian dictatorship (or, before that, the overthrow of tsarism) – and for his ruthless criticism of a labour aristocratic minority which misled the masses with solely reformist demands. Hence why he said revolutionaries had to “dig deeper into the real masses” of the poorest workers, who had the least to lose and the most to gain. This meant that, in Russia, he saw the need for an alliance between workers and poor peasants, an alliance that Leon Trotsky initially rejected. Today, real Leninists still see the poorest and most oppressed workers as the main protagonists of revolution. The claim that the industrial proletariat is dead is either dishonest or smacks of ‘first world’ myopia. The industrial proletariat may have shrunk in the imperialist nations over the past 40 years but internationally it has grown spectacularly. In 2010, 79%, or 541 million, of the world’s industrial workers lived in ‘less developed regions’, up from 34% in 1950 and 53% in 1980, compared to the 145 million industrial workers, or 21% of the total, who in 2010 lived in the imperialist countries.[442] This shift is even greater in the manufacturing industry, since in emerging nations manufacturing forms a much higher proportion of total industrial employment than in imperialist countries, and therefore, as John Bellamy Foster et al point out, “the broad category of ‘industrial employment’ systematically understates the extent to which the world share of manufacturing has grown in developing countries”, citing figures for the US and China showing these ratios to be 58.1% and 75.2% respectively.[443] “Extrapolating these two ratios to ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ countries as a whole, 83% of the world’s manufacturing workforce lives and works in the nations of the Global South,” says John Smith in Imperialism in the Twenty First Century.[444] Based on the integration of ‘Southern’ workers into the global economy, the IMF has also attempted to take into account qualitative as well as quantitative changes, calculating an “export-weighted global workforce” by multiplying the numerical growth of the workforce by the increasing degree to which they produce for the global market rather than the domestic market. Since Southern-manufactured exports grew more than twice as fast as GDP during the quarter-century leading up to the global crisis in 2007, the IMF estimates that the effective global workforce quadrupled in size between 1980 and 2003. But even within the imperialist nations, where the industrial working class has declined both absolutely and relatively, Smith points to “deepening proletarianisation”, saying that “the proletarians have increased their already overwhelming predominance within the economically active population [EAP].... Between 1980 and 2005 the proportion of waged and salaried workers in total EAP in ... the developed nations steadily rose, from 83% to 88% (in 2005, around 500 million people), indicating deepening proletarianisation in these countries.”[445] In the US, it is even higher, with waged workers as a proportion of the EAP increasing from 90.6% in 1980 to 93.2% in 2011.[446] Because of distortions made by the ILO’s methods, this undoubtedly underestimates or obscures the size of the labour aristocracy, something we will come back to further on, but the trend is nevertheless clear, with more and more workers being forced into low-paid services work. Obviously with China, India and the former Soviet bloc being integrated into the global economy, 1.47 billion workers joined the global capitalist workforce very suddenly. But this does not distort the overall trend. With their supposed bias for the industrial proletariat, Leninists are accused of failing to recognise the multiple sections of the working class or its fragmentation. But far from ignoring the heterogeneous make-up of the working class, this is one of the factors that contribute to the Leninist conclusion that a vanguard party is necessary – to unite the disparate and sectional struggles of the working class into one unstoppable force. Likewise, the fact recognised across the left that technological advances have fragmented the working class, that they have increased unemployment and underemployment and therefore reduced workers’ leverage in their struggles against their bosses, reflected in the imperialist countries by the low number of strikes since the 1980s, must mean that the state is the primary battleground. We are already seeing this in the re-emergence of social democratic movements (see the previous chapter), whereby downwardly mobile labour aristocracies are becoming slightly more antagonistic towards the ruling class, and are attempting to harness the power of the working class as a whole, in what is essentially a fight with the middle and ruling classes over allocations of surplus value. These strawman accusations against Lenin misrepresent or misinterpret his definition of the proletariat, which followed Marx’s. The main feature of the proletariat as a class is not its direct link with the means of production but rather its separation from them. In other words, the proletariat is first and foremost characterised as a class by the fact that it does not own the means of production and has to work for wages. The salient feature is not what differentiates them, but what unites them. The more a worker is dependant on selling their labour power for survival the deeper their proletarianisation. Indeed, it is the fact that the industrial proletariat is shrinking relative to the working class as a whole, relegating a significant proportion of previously privileged workers into the poorer sections of the working class, that sees the mass of the latter grow numerically in strength. As the mass of exploited manual workers decreases due to scientific and technological progress, particularly automation, the mass of exploited intellectual workers, ie white collar employees, engineers and scientists (who increasingly contribute to commodity production) also increases in reverse proportion. The casualisation of university employment in the past few years is a case in point. In the US, although union membership stood at a lowly 10.7% of the workforce at the start of 2019, the unionisation of traditionally non- unionised white collar labour almost doubled between 2010 and 2017.[447] According to the Pew Research Center, the median wealth (assets minus debts) of the US middle class fell by 28% from 2001 to 2013.[448] People on middle incomes[449] accounted for 50% of the US adult population in 2015, down from 61% in 1971, while the poorest tier of the working class comprised 20% of the population in 2015 compared to 16% in 1975. The number of people receiving supplemental nutritional assistance, or food stamps, exploded from 26 million in 2007 to 46 million in 2012.[450] And 63% of the population say they have less than $500 in personal savings.[451] At the same time private and household debt has gone through the roof. In the 1970s, personal and credit card debts shot up by 238% relative to the 1960s. In the 1980s it shot up on the previous decade by another 318% and by another 180% in the 1990s.[452] According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, household debt rose to a record $13.5 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2018, nearly 7% higher than in the third quarter of 2008. Even more troublingly, a record number of US Americans were three months or more behind on repayments for car loans (more than 7 million). As New York Times journalist Amy Chozick noted in May 2015, “the once ubiquitous term ‘middle class’ has gone conspicuously missing from the 2016 [presidential] campaign trail, as candidates and their strategists grasp for new terms for an unsettled economic era [in which] the middle class has for millions of families become a precarious place to be”.[453] Capitalism in the age of automation increasingly turns the majority of the population into proletarians and, in doing so, creates all economic, social and political prerequisites for the system’s downfall. The deeper the system sinks into crisis, the more proletarians are created, through unemployment, wage cuts and so on, and the more radical they are likely to become. This is borne out by the real development of the international proletariat. While we have already seen that the industrial proletariat has grown enormously, according to the ILO, the world’s “economically active population” (EAP) grew from 1.9 billion in 1980 to 3.1 billion in 2006.[454] Almost all of this numerical growth took place in the ‘emerging nations’, now home to 84% of the global workforce, 1.6 billion of whom worked for wages. The other one billion were small farmers and a multitude of people working in the ‘informal economy’,[455] which is, according to Mike Davis “the fastest growing social class on earth”.[456] While the industrial proletariat in the ‘Global South’ has grown enormously since 1980, its share of the South’s total workforce has been much more modest, rising from 14.5% in 1980, to 16.1% in 1990, to 19.1% in 2000, to 23.1% in 2010[457] – because the absolute growth of the non-industrial proletariat is even greater. Meanwhile, agricultural employment in the Global South has declined to 48% of its EAP, down from 73% in 1960, and from “approximately one-third” to just 4% of EAP in developed countries. However, the ILO reports: “Despite the declining share of agricultural workers in total employment, the absolute numbers of those engaged in agriculture are still rising, most notably in south Asia, east Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.”[458] The other significant component of the growing proletariat? The unemployed. Smith reports that, apart from China, “no economy has grown fast enough to provide jobs to the legions of young people entering the labour market and the rural exodus to swollen cities in search of work. Even at the zenith of export-oriented industrialisation the ILO reported that ‘in the late 20th century, manufacturing ceased being a major sector of employment growth, except in east and southeast Asia’.” Senior ILO economist Nomaan Majid said the commerce sector, not manufacturing, “is the main employment growth sector in both low- and middle-income groups”.[459] This links back to what we saw in chapter four – that even in the developing nations, the trend towards automation is accompanied by growing unproductive work and unemployment. The numerical growth of the working class has been coupled with a massive attack on its wages, further deepening proletarianisation. In a striking example of how constant capital rises relative to variable capital, John Lanchester writes in the London Review of Books that in the US: “In 1960, the most profitable company in the world’s biggest economy was General Motors (GM). In today’s money, GM made $7.6bn that year. It also employed 600,000 people. Today’s most profitable company employs 92,600. So where 600,000 workers would once generate $7.6bn in profit, now 92,600 generate $89.9bn, an improvement in profitability per worker of 76.65 times. Remember, this is pure profit for the company’s owners, after all workers have been paid. Capital isn’t just winning against labour: there’s no contest. If it were a boxing match, the referee would stop the fight.”[460] Whereas wages in the US rose by 350% between 1927 and 1977, real terms growth has since been in decline. In Britain, wages grew at an annual average of 2.9% in the 1960s and 70s, 1.5% in the 90s and 1.2% in the 2000s. Between 2007 and 2015 that trend accelerated at an unprecedented rate, with real household wages falling by 10.4%.[461] The Resolution Foundation said the 2010s would be the worst decade for UK wage growth since the late 18th century. But as bad as the attack on wages in imperialist countries has been, it has been even worse in the countries imperialism plunders, where workers are of course already paid much less. According to the ILO’s World of Work Report 2011, since the early 1990s the “share of domestic income that goes to labour ... declined in nearly three-quarters of the 69 countries with available information”. While “the wage share among advanced economies has been trending downward since 1975”, it “occurred at a much more moderate pace than among emerging and developing economies – falling roughly nine percentage points since 1980”.[462] In contrast, the fall in Asia between 1994 and 2010 was around 20%. The imperialist countries have also seen a decline in full-time self- employment and self-employed income. This has included a continuing shrinkage in the number of small family farmers, indicating the proletarianisation of portions of the lower middle classes. Michael Elsby’s study The Decline of US Labor Share reports that the “rise in inequality is even more striking for proprietors’ income than it is for payroll income. In 1948 the bottom 90% of employees earned 75% of payroll compensation. By 2010 this had declined to 54%. For entrepreneurial income, however, this fraction plummeted from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 2010.”[463] A separate study of 2014 data by the US Small Business Administration suggests the same pattern regarding millennials (generally defined as people born between 1985 and 2004). “Fewer than 4% of 30 year-olds reported they were in full-time self-employment – a proxy for entrepreneurship – compared with 5.4% of Generation X-ers [1965 and 1984] and 6.7% of Baby Boomers [1945 and 1964] at the same age,” the FT reported.[464] Furthermore, the pace of decline in wages has accelerated in recent years, “with the wage share falling more than 11 percentage points between 2002 and 2006. In China, the wage share declined by close to 10 percentage points since 2000.”[465] Africa’s workers saw their share of national income reduced by 15% in the two decades since 1990, again “with most of this decline – 10 percentage points – taking place since 2000. The decline is even more spectacular in north Africa, where the wage share fell by more than 30 percentage points after 2000.”[466] Latin America saw the lowest decline, of 10% since 1993, and most of it before 2000, undoubtedly due to strong workers’ organisation and resistance, represented by the left-wing ‘Pink Tide’ in Venezuela,[467] Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina. As mentioned, mainstream economic accounting methods underepresent the size of the middle classes and labour aristocracy – which are bound to be proportionately bigger in imperialist nations – and do not take account of sharply increasing inequality between skilled/professional and unskilled workers or of income to capital that has been classified as income to labour, such as bonuses paid to bankers and wages and sponsorship of sports professionals etc, meaning the real extent of the fall in labour’s share is even higher, and considerably so. Elsby attempts to challenge these distortions, writing that in the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) calculation of a decline of 3.9% in the share of national income for labour over 1987-2013 becomes a 10% decline when the highest paid 1% of employees are excluded, and a 14% decline when the highest paid 10% are excluded. Based on this more honest method, the lowest 90% of wage earners (84% of the US’s total economically active population) actually earned 42% of the total payroll in 1980 and just 28% in 2011. Elsby also found that the fall for labour has accelerated as time has progressed, declining by twice as much between 2000 and 2011 as in the previous two decades.[468] Again, the trend towards deepening proletarianisation is clear. The material basis for a position of relative privilege among the lower middle classes and labour aristocracy is disappearing. The proletariat is numerically stronger than ever, especially as an international class. ‘Neoliberal globalisation’, which promised to produce prosperous nations of entrepreneurs and homeowners, has instead produced capitalism’s grave-diggers. All this is confirmed by the fact that inequality has hit record levels. In 2018 and 2019, Oxfam found that the 26 richest billionaires owned as much in assets as the 3.8 billion people who make up the poorest half of the planet’s population. The number had been 61 in 2016 and 43 in 2017, showing again that capital continues to centralise. Marx wrote that the concentration of wealth at one pole depended on the concentration of poverty at the other. And lo: the wealth of more than 2,200 billionaires across the globe increased by $900bn in 2018, a 12% increase against a fall of 11% in the wealth of the poorest half of the world’s population. Between 1980 and 2015, the global economy grew by 380%, yet the number of people living in poverty on less than $5 (£3.20) a day increased by more than 1.1 billion. In 1980, $2.20 of every $100 went to the world’s poorest 20%, but in 2003 that figure had fallen to 60 cents.[469] Inequality is most acute between rich and poor countries but it is growing within rich countries as well. In the US, for example, according to the Federal Reserve, the richest 1% owned a record-high 38.6% of the country’s wealth in 2016, nearly twice as much as the bottom 90%. Anti-socialists will still ignore all this or proclaim that the proletariat is no longer a revolutionary class because living standards are generally much higher than 100 years ago, claiming that really “we are all middle class now” or making shallow observations such as “capitalism works because workers have mobile phones!” as if cracking some kind of insightful gotcha that disproves Marxism. This ignores how as the rate of exploitation increases, the value of necessary labour falls, making the commodities workers need to buy to live cheaper. It ignores how the needs of the working class change as capitalism develops: workers need smartphones and laptops in this day and age of 24-hour connectivity if they are even to be considered employable, and so the cost of a smartphone is included in the value of labour power. It also ignores that workers in some countries may have access to better infrastructure than in others (indeed, although no technology has ever scaled as quickly as the mobile phone, while five billion people now have mobile phones, only around 2.5 billion of world’s population presently have a smartphone). But most of all, it is ignorant of the fact that capitalism is breaking down, which will impoverish and radicalise the working class. The revolutionary power of the working class is latent.

# 2AC

## T

### 2AC---T

#### 2. Function---Nationalization is an antitrust policy

**Hewitt 21** [Liane Hewitt, historian of political economy and international order at Princeton, Economic History Workshop is a monthly seminar series for Princeton students and faculty interested in the study of economic history, co-sponsored by the Department of History at Princeton and the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance, the workshop provides a forum for scholars to present their findings and receive feedback on their research in a wide array of subfields, such as financial, business, labor, legal, intellectual, technological, and social history, Nationalization as Anti-Trust Policy: The Post-War Anti-Fascist Moment in France, Britain and West-Germany, 1944-51,” Feb 4, 2021, https://jrc.princeton.edu/events/hewitt-spring-2021]

This dissertation asks how international cartels became rejected after the Second World as the private scaffolding for organizing European capitalism and international order. After 1918, a broad consensus of actors (governments, politicians, legal and economic experts, and sectors of socialists, labor and consumer groups) boosted cartels as a near-panacea for stabilizing chaotic markets, securing the fragile peace, and building a common market that could hold its own against American Fordist mass-production and distribution. This chapter argues that the sweeping nationalization reforms enacted at the end of WW2 by Britain and France, under the Attlee Labour government and the Resistance-controlled Constituent Assembly respectively, should be seen as pivotal episodes in Western Europe’s anti-cartel turn. This interpretation brings together two traditionally separate historiographies: the first on the post-war social-democratic moment and the construction of national welfare states, and the second more technical literature on post-1945 de-cartelization. The chapter suggests that governments and activists justified nationalization as an anti-trust policy to defeat the anti-democratic, perhaps even fascistic power of private big-business over the state and national economic life. The organized Left had proposed comprehensive nationalization reforms since the end of WW1. But it was not until the anti-fascist and Liberation moment swept Britain and France in the wake of the victory of 1944-45 that governments took control of the commanding heights of their economies: notably credit, energy (gas, coal), transport, and iron and steel (in Britain, only). The chapter will conclude by briefly considering alternative national solutions to the cartel problem after 1945, which did not involve state nationalizations in Scandinavia and West Germany. American occupation and a weaker post-war anti-fascist moment in these countries may hold the key to explaining why they did not take the nationalization-as-antitrust policy route.

#### 3. Expand---if they’re right nationalization isn’t part of antitrust now, the plan changes the law to make it broader and inclusive of it

Hatter ’90 [Terry J Jr; March 20; January District Court Judge at the entral District of California; Westlaw, “In re Eastport Assocs.,” 114 B.R. 686]

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that “[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium.” Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term “expand” indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### ‘Expand’ means increasing the number, volume or extent of

Fahey ’19 [Eugene; October 22; Judge on the Court of Appeals of New York, dissenting; Westlaw, “Adirondack Wild: Friends of the Forest Pres. v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency,” 34 N.Y.3d 184]

The Rivers Act does not define the word “expanded.” “In the absence of a statutory definition, ‘we construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonly understood meaning, and in that connection have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts in determining the meaning of a word or phrase’ ” (Yaniveth R. v LTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186, 192 [2016], quoting Rosner v Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 96 NY2d 475, 479-480 [2001]). One ordinary meaning of “expand,” and the one relevant here, is “to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, expand [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expand]; see also Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 402 [1977] [“to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of”]). Accordingly, for DEC's determination that motor vehicle use on the road would not “expand” to be rational, there must be some basis in the record upon which DEC could reasonably conclude that once the road is opened to the public, motor vehicle use on the road would not increase in extent, number, volume, or scope.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ include any unfair competition law.

CFR ’21 [Code of Federal Regulations; current through July 1; originally promulgated in 1983’s “Export Trade Certificates of Review,” 48 FR 10596-01; Westlaw, “§ 325.2 Definitions,” 15 C.F.R. § 325.2]

As used in this part:

(a) Act means title III of Pub.L. 97–290, Export Trade Certificates of Review.

(b) Antitrust laws means the antitrust laws, as the term is defined in the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12), section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) (to the extent that section 5 prohibits unfair methods of competition), and any State antitrust or unfair competition law.

#### ‘Antitrust law’ includes behavior and enforcement

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

## CP

### 2AC---CP---Antitrust PIC

#### Nationalization is anti-trust

**Hewitt 21** [Liane Hewitt, historian of political economy and international order at Princeton, Economic History Workshop is a monthly seminar series for Princeton students and faculty interested in the study of economic history, co-sponsored by the Department of History at Princeton and the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance, the workshop provides a forum for scholars to present their findings and receive feedback on their research in a wide array of subfields, such as financial, business, labor, legal, intellectual, technological, and social history, Nationalization as Anti-Trust Policy: The Post-War Anti-Fascist Moment in France, Britain and West-Germany, 1944-51,” Feb 4, 2021, https://jrc.princeton.edu/events/hewitt-spring-2021]

This dissertation asks how international cartels became rejected after the Second World as the private scaffolding for organizing European capitalism and international order. After 1918, a broad consensus of actors (governments, politicians, legal and economic experts, and sectors of socialists, labor and consumer groups) boosted cartels as a near-panacea for stabilizing chaotic markets, securing the fragile peace, and building a common market that could hold its own against American Fordist mass-production and distribution. This chapter argues that the sweeping nationalization reforms enacted at the end of WW2 by Britain and France, under the Attlee Labour government and the Resistance-controlled Constituent Assembly respectively, should be seen as pivotal episodes in Western Europe’s anti-cartel turn. This interpretation brings together two traditionally separate historiographies: the first on the post-war social-democratic moment and the construction of national welfare states, and the second more technical literature on post-1945 de-cartelization. The chapter suggests that governments and activists justified nationalization as an anti-trust policy to defeat the anti-democratic, perhaps even fascistic power of private big-business over the state and national economic life. The organized Left had proposed comprehensive nationalization reforms since the end of WW1. But it was not until the anti-fascist and Liberation moment swept Britain and France in the wake of the victory of 1944-45 that governments took control of the commanding heights of their economies: notably credit, energy (gas, coal), transport, and iron and steel (in Britain, only). The chapter will conclude by briefly considering alternative national solutions to the cartel problem after 1945, which did not involve state nationalizations in Scandinavia and West Germany. American occupation and a weaker post-war anti-fascist moment in these countries may hold the key to explaining why they did not take the nationalization-as-antitrust policy route.

#### Core antitrust laws exempt labor---nationalizing corporations necessitates removing those

Elhauge ’17 [Einer; December 6; Law Professor at Harvard University; United States Antitrust Law and Economics, “Introduction: An Overview of Antitrust Laws and Remedial Structure,” p. 46-49]

d. THE LABOR EXEMPTIONS. Without a labor exemption, ordinary union activities like strikes or setting labor prices in collective bargaining agreements would be horizontal boycotts and price-fixing agreements subject to the risk of antitrust liability. To avoid this, Congress has enacted statutes that provide antitrust exemptions for, and bar injunctions against, such ordinary labor union activities as collective refusals to supply labor or agreements not to compete on wages or other employment terms. This explicit statutory exemption protects agreements among labor employees, but not among independent contractors who collectively engage in boycotts or price-fixing. The explicit statutory exemption extends only to conduct and agreements by employees and their unions, and not to their agreements with non-labor groups.

#### Limited antitrust scope entrenches the control of capital---the plan radically departs from historical antitrust policies in favor of the abolition of capitalism

Fuchs '12 [Christian; 7/1/12; professor and chair in media and communication studies at Uppsala University's Department of Informatics and Media; "With or Without Marx? With or Without Capitalism? A Rejoinder to Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni," https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v10i2.434/]

Do Arvidsson and Colleoni suggest alternatives? Do they have a vision of a life beyond capitalism? Open access, data portability, antitrust policies against capital concentration, building alternative platforms are mentioned in their article. They imagine “more ’democratic’“ social media (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012, 147), do not question capitalism as such, but rather suggest a stronger regulation of the corporate Internet shall according to this conception exist in parallel with some alternative Internet platforms. The answer to the question asked in the title of this contribution is that to choose to be without Marx means to be in favour of capitalism and to support ideology, as Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni’s approach shows very clearly. They advance an approach that is not only directed against Marx, but as a consequence also supportive of capitalism.

Arvidsson (2010) argues for building a peer-review system that is used for the evaluation of products by consumers and producers as an important element of an “ethical economy”. Social media, mobile phones and RFID could help to bring about a global and universal quantitative rating system for the economy (Arvidsson 2009). Arvidsson (2008) says that in such a system, the power of consumers and workers would increase, that companies as a result would mainly make money in the financial markets, and that capitalism would “become ethical in new and radical ways“ (Arvidsson 2008, 336). This would mean a “reform of capitalism“, the emergence of blended values and of a “global New Deal organised around sustainability and social responsibility“ (Arvidsson 2009, 27).

Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012, 147) say that their approach is “very un-Marxist in its conclusions”. Its political implications show indeed that the motivation for the authors’ criticism of Marxist theory is that they want to improve and not abolish capitalism. They imagine a more just, sustainable, and responsible capitalism. This terminology not only fits perfectly into contemporary neoliberal ideology, but is also naïve and idealistic: It ignores that all forms of capitalism are based on inequality and are crisis-prone. And crisis always means misery, precariousness, and more inequality. Capitalism is never responsible, sustainable, or ethical. The suggestion to entrepreneurs that they should support the ethical economy concept because such a transformed economy would enable them to make profits in the financial markets is furthermore arguing for an advancement of financialization and thereby ignores the high crisis-proneness of financial capitalism that has been proofed once more recently in the new world economic crisis. Arvidsson imagines that capitalism and a non-capitalistic economy can friendly co-exist in the form of an ethical capitalism. He thereby ignores the imperialistic and colonialist character of capitalism: imperialism creates milieus of accumulation, i.e. it commodifies spheres of non-capitalist existence in processes that David Harvey (2003) has termed accumulation by dispossession in order to guarantee its further existence. Capitalism is an inherently violent and expansive system that, as history has shown, does not accept any friendly co-existence with non-capitalist systems, but aims at their destruction. The contemporary crisis of capitalism and the existence of global inequality and precariousness have shown that we need alternatives to capitalism in order to create a humane society. My conclusion and approach is therefore in contrast to Arvidsson Marxist in character: it aims at the struggle for a humane, non-capitalist world. In terms of the Internet this means the ethical need of struggles for a non-capitalist Internet and the advancement of non-capitalist Internet platforms that contradict and struggle against the capitalist Internet and aim at the establishment of a communist Internet.

## K

### 2AC---Perm

#### Perm do both---the neg must prove the alternative is functionally competitive---anything else amplifies capitalist splintering tactics and dooms inter-movement cooperation necessary to displace capitalism

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### 2AC---State Key

#### The state is key to any realistic climate solution---otherwise unchecked corporations will usurp power

Parenti 15 [\*former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with \*\*Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt (Christian and Vincent, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” *Online University of the Left*, [http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)](http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)//BB)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner? Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into. This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle. When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it. Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government. We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government. The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue. Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can. Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month. As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital. I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives? It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation. You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news. For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this. Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left. Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources? Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly stand up to them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated. If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.

### 2AC---AT: No Progress

#### First, materially---a confluence of statistical factors prove racial progress is possible and occurring.

Hochschild 17 (Jennifer L. Hochschild , Professor of Government, African and African American Studies, and the Chair of the Department of Government (Harvard University), Chair in American Law and Governance at the Library of Congress, President of the American Political Science Association, “Left Pessimism and Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, March 15th, p. 6-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716004102> \*\*modified to allow for more humanizing frames)

Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas? It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.” The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between ~~blacks’~~ [black people’s] and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. ~~Blacks~~ [Black people] are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly. Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to political scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20 Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people’s] are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people] are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class ~~blacks~~ [black people] were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21 In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations; one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23 Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24 This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice. Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic? That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25 One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that“although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27 And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

#### Second, theoretically---their theory is overly deterministic, has no basis, and provides an alibi for disengagement

Birge 19 (Charles, MA in Comparative Studies, “The Addiction of Transparency: Observations on the Emotional Neurophysiology of Whiteness.” Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University. <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1554891264402108&disposition=inline> //shree)

This deeper structure of race is more fully elucidated by the theoretical perspective of Afro-Pessimism, which has also greatly influenced my thinking on whiteness. Afro-Pessimism arose out of the innovations of black scholars Orlando Patterson (1982), Hortense Spillers (1987), and Saidiya Hartman (1997), and has been elaborated by Frank Wilderson (2010), Jared Sexton (2008), Christina Sharpe (2010, 2016), and Fred Moten (2003), among many others. While “Afro-Pessimism” is not a monolithic term, and not all of these scholars identify with it, all of them explore similar territory: they theorize blackness--both past and present--as a condition of absolute (or nearly absolute) captivity in which the expectations, norms, and laws of human relationality (e.g., gender, kinship, personhood) do not apply--the black slave is, again, “socially dead.” This means that blackness is beyond the purview of Human ethical institutions such as the state, the law, civil society, and politics writ large (even revolutionary politics). Moreover, this condition of social death is the ground against which the modern notion of Humanity indexes itself; that is, in the modern world, Humanity only knows itself in all of its capacities (the ability to reason, to have emotions, to enter into intimate and civil relationships) against the absolute incapacity of black slaves. Thus, AfroPessimism argues that black enslavement is not merely a tool of economic exploitation; it serves as a symbolic position against which the existential and psychological security of Humanity is obtained--a condition which persists in the present day. In psychoanalytic terms, then, it functions unconsciously to sustain the psychic health of the Human. While the positions of Human Mastery can be occupied by various non-black peoples depending on the needs of the structure, it is most closely correlated with whiteness. So, for AfroPessimism whiteness is not merely a social construction that secures the hegemony; whiteness is an existential structure, instantiated in the unconscious, the very nature of which is to parasitically prevent racial others--blackness in particular--from accessing the agency needed to participate in the struggle for hegemony. The Afro-Pessimist analysis resonated with me. Given how easily white supremacy seems to resist conscious denunciation, it seemed sensible to argue that the nature of whiteness was to parasitically suck dry the agency of people of color, blackness in particular. However, Afro-Pessimism also has a problem: it is, by definition, abstract and essentialist, leading to difficulties and confusion when discussing how it functions phenomenologically in everyday life. Challenging questions abound: if blackness is theorized as so totalizing that formations such as gender and class lose their significance, can it provide an alibi for black patriarchy and class elitism? And if whiteness is so totalizing, does it mean that white people can simply dismiss the possibility of political engagement and responsibility as out of their control? How would one theorize the diverging interests of a wealthy black man and a poor indigenous woman--is she still privileged in her contingent Humanity over his absolute enslavement? In a quasitheological fashion, Afro-Pessimism risks outsourcing the demands, nuances, and agency of everyday life to an abstraction that seems transcendent. Some Afro-Pessimist scholars attempt to address this problem. Sexton (“Peopleof-Color Blindness, 35-36), for example, analyzes ontology politically, rather than philosophically or theologically; he argues that the ontology of race is not actually a transcendent principle, but it is so deeply entrenched that it takes on the appearance of one. Wilderson (following Sexton) theorizes that race functions as a “libidinal economy” of unconscious psychic identification (with the mastery/capacity of whiteness) and abjection (of enslaved blackness) that structures “the whole of psychic life.” (Wilderson, 9) But both of these political and libidinal explanations still rely heavily on a near transcendent structural analysis, theorized as absolutely unconscious and always already present; they do not suggest how they might be accessed by conscious awareness, and there is no specific moment or condition in which they begin, other than the Middle Passage. But didn’t the Middle Passage arise out of certain conditions? And couldn’t undoing those conditions also undo the existential structure of whiteness? And what about the unconscious--is it really impossible to access? Sexton and Wilderson do not offer much practical guidance here, other than their unwavering commitment to stare down the structural antagonism of race.1

#### Third, historically---anti-black racism is not static, but shaped by socialization and specific policies

Harari 15 [Yuval Noah Harari, Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, specializing in World History, Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford University, and an acclaimed author whose first book, Sapiens, was an international bestseller that received lavish praise by figures ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Gates, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind,* tr. by Yuval Harari with help from John Purcell and Haim Watzman, HarperCollins: Broadway, NY, 2015, p. 133-144]

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN HISTORY IN THE millennia following the Agricultural Revolution boils down to a single question: how did humans organise themselves in mass-cooperation networks, when they lacked the biological instincts necessary to sustain such networks? The short answer is that humans created imagined orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance. However, the appearance of these networks was, for many, a dubious blessing. The imagined orders sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves. Superiors got all the good things in life. Commoners got what was left. Slaves got a beating if they complained. Despite its proclamation of the equality of all men, the imagined order established by the Americans in 1776 also established a hierarchy. It created a hierarchy between men, who benefited from it, and women, whom it left disempowered. It created a hierarchy between whites, who enjoyed liberty, and blacks and American Indians, who were considered humans of a lesser type and therefore did not share in the equal rights of men. Many of those who signed the Declaration of Independence were slaveholders. They did not release their slaves upon signing the Declaration, nor did they consider themselves hypocrites. In their view, the rights of men had little to do with Negroes. The American order also consecrated the hierarchy between rich and poor. Most Americans at that time had little problem with the inequality caused by wealthy parents passing their money and businesses on to their children. In their view, equality meant simply that the same laws applied to rich and poor. It had nothing to do with unemployment benefits, integrated education or health insurance. Liberty, too, carried very different connotations than it does today. In 1776, it did not mean that the disempowered (certainly not blacks or Indians or, God forbid, women) could gain and exercise power. It meant simply that the state could not, except in unusual circumstances, confiscate a citizen’s private property or tell him what to do with it. The American order thereby upheld the hierarchy of wealth, which some thought was mandated by God and others viewed as representing the immutable laws of nature. Nature, it was claimed, rewarded merit with wealth while penalising indolence. All the above-mentioned distinctions – between free persons and slaves, between whites and blacks, between rich and poor – are rooted in fictions. (The hierarchy of men and women will be discussed later.) Yet it is an iron rule of history that every imagined hierarchy disavows its fictional origins and claims to be natural and inevitable. For instance, many people who have viewed the hierarchy of free persons and slaves as natural and correct have argued that slavery is not a human invention. Hammurabi saw it as ordained by the gods. Aristotle argued that slaves have a ‘slavish nature’ whereas free people have a ‘free nature’. Their status in society is merely a reflection of their innate nature. Ask white supremacists about the racial hierarchy, and you are in for a pseudoscientific lecture concerning the biological differences between the races. You are likely to be told that there is something in Caucasian blood or genes that makes whites naturally more intelligent, moral and hardworking. Ask a diehard capitalist about the hierarchy of wealth, and you are likely to hear that it is the inevitable outcome of objective differences in abilities. The rich have more money, in this view, because they are more capable and diligent. No one should be bothered, then, if the wealthy get better health care, better education and better nutrition. The rich richly deserve every perk they enjoy. People with lighter skin colour are typically more in danger of sunburn than people with darker skin. Yet there was no biological logic behind the division of South African beaches. Beaches reserved for people with lighter skin were not characterised by lower levels of ultraviolet radiation. Hindus who adhere to the caste system believe that cosmic forces have made one caste superior to another. According to a famous Hindu creation myth, the gods fashioned the world out of the body of a primeval being, the Purusa. The sun was created from the Purusa’s eye, the moon from the Purusa’s brain, the Brahmins (priests) from its mouth, the Kshatriyas (warriors) from its arms, the Vaishyas (peasants and merchants) from its thighs, and the Shudras (servants) from its legs. Accept this explanation and the sociopolitical differences between Brahmins and Shudras are as natural and eternal as the differences between the sun and the moon.1 The ancient Chinese believed that when the goddess Nü Wa created humans from earth, she kneaded aristocrats from fine yellow soil, whereas commoners were formed from brown mud.2 Yet, to the best of our understanding, these hierarchies are all the product of human imagination. Brahmins and Shudras were not really created by the gods from different body parts of a primeval being. Instead, the distinction between the two castes was created by laws and norms invented by humans in northern India about 3,000 years ago. Contrary to Aristotle, there is no known biological difference between slaves and free people. Human laws and norms have turned some people into slaves and others into masters. Between blacks and whites there are some objective biological differences, such as skin colour and hair type, but there is no evidence that the differences extend to intelligence or morality. Most people claim that their social hierarchy is natural and just, while those of other societies are based on false and ridiculous criteria. Modern Westerners are taught to scoff at the idea of racial hierarchy. They are shocked by laws prohibiting blacks to live in white neighbourhoods, or to study in white schools, or to be treated in white hospitals. But the hierarchy of rich and poor – which mandates that rich people live in separate and more luxurious neighbourhoods, study in separate and more prestigious schools, and receive medical treatment in separate and better-equipped facilities – seems perfectly sensible to many Americans and Europeans. Yet it’s a proven fact that most rich people are rich for the simple reason that they were born into a rich family, while most poor people will remain poor throughout their lives simply because they were born into a poor family. Unfortunately, complex human societies seem to require imagined hierarchies and unjust discrimination. Of course not all hierarchies are morally identical, and some societies suffered from more extreme types of discrimination than others, yet scholars know of no large society that has been able to dispense with discrimination altogether. Time and again people have created order in their societies by classifying the population into imagined categories, such as superiors, commoners and slaves; whites and blacks; patricians and plebeians; Brahmins and Shudras; or rich and poor. These categories have regulated relations between millions of humans by making some people legally, politically or socially superior to others. Hierarchies serve an important function. They enable complete strangers to know how to treat one another without wasting the time and energy needed to become personally acquainted. In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Henry Higgins doesn’t need to establish an intimate acquaintance with Eliza Doolittle in order to understand how he should relate to her. Just hearing her talk tells him that she is a member of the underclass with whom he can do as he wishes – for example, using her as a pawn in his bet to pass off a jower girl as a duchess. A modern Eliza working at a jorist’s needs to know how much effort to put into selling roses and gladioli to the dozens of people who enter the shop each day. She can’t make a detailed enquiry into the tastes and wallets of each individual. Instead, she uses social cues – the way the person is dressed, his or her age, and if she’s not politically correct his skin colour. That is how she immediately distinguishes between the accounting-firm partner who’s likely to place a large order for expensive roses, and a messenger boy who can only afford a bunch of daisies. Of course, differences in natural abilities also play a role in the formation of social distinctions. But such diversities of aptitudes and character are usually mediated through imagined hierarchies. This happens in two important ways. First and foremost, most abilities have to be nurtured and developed. Even if somebody is born with a particular talent, that talent will usually remain latent if it is not fostered, honed and exercised. Not all people get the same chance to cultivate and refine their abilities. Whether or not they have such an opportunity will usually depend on their place within their society’s imagined hierarchy. Harry Potter is a good example. Removed from his distinguished wizard family and brought up by ignorant muggles, he arrives at Hogwarts without any experience in magic. It takes him seven books to gain a firm command of his powers and knowledge of his unique abilities. Second, even if people belonging to different classes develop exactly the same abilities, they are unlikely to enjoy equal success because they will have to play the game by different rules. If, in British-ruled India, an Untouchable, a Brahmin, a Catholic Irishman and a Protestant Englishman had somehow developed exactly the same business acumen, they still would not have had the same chance of becoming rich. The economic game was rigged by legal restrictions and unoɽcial glass ceilings. The Vicious Circle All societies are based on imagined hierarchies, but not necessarily on the same hierarchies. What accounts for the differences? Why did traditional Indian society classify people according to caste, Ottoman society according to religion, and American society according to race? In most cases the hierarchy originated as the result of a set of accidental historical circumstances and was then perpetuated and refined over many generations as different groups developed vested interests in it. For instance, many scholars surmise that the Hindu caste system took shape when Indo-Aryan people invaded the Indian subcontinent about 3,000 years ago, subjugating the local population. The invaders established a stratified society, in which they – of course – occupied the leading positions (priests and warriors), leaving the natives to live as servants and slaves. The invaders, who were few in number, feared losing their privileged status and unique identity. To forestall this danger, they divided the population into castes, each of which was required to pursue a specific occupation or perform a specific role in society. Each had different legal status, privileges and duties. Mixing of castes – social interaction, marriage, even the sharing of meals – was prohibited. And the distinctions were not just legal – they became an inherent part of religious mythology and practice. The rulers argued that the caste system rejected an eternal cosmic reality rather than a chance historical development. Concepts of purity and impurity were essential elements in Hindu religion, and they were harnessed to buttress the social pyramid. Pious Hindus were taught that contact with members of a different caste could pollute not only them personally, but society as a whole, and should therefore be abhorred. Such ideas are hardly unique to Hindus. Throughout history, and in almost all societies, concepts of pollution and purity have played a leading role in enforcing social and political divisions and have been exploited by numerous ruling classes to maintain their privileges. The fear of pollution is not a complete fabrication of priests and princes, however. It probably has its roots in biological survival mechanisms that make humans feel an instinctive revulsion towards potential disease carriers, such as sick persons and dead bodies. If you want to keep any human group isolated – women, Jews, Roma, gays, blacks – the best way to do it is convince everyone that these people are a source of pollution. The Hindu caste system and its attendant laws of purity became deeply embedded in Indian culture. Long after the Indo-Aryan invasion was forgotten, Indians continued to believe in the caste system and to abhor the pollution caused by caste mixing. Castes were not immune to change. In fact, as time went by, large castes were divided into sub-castes. Eventually the original four castes turned into 3,000 different groupings called jati (literally ‘birth’). But this proliferation of castes did not change the basic principle of the system, according to which every person is born into a particular rank, and any infringement of its rules pollutes the person and society as a whole. A persons jati determines her profession, the food she can eat, her place of residence and her eligible marriage partners. Usually a person can marry only within his or her caste, and the resulting children inherit that status. Whenever a new profession developed or a new group of people appeared on the scene, they had to be recognised as a caste in order to receive a legitimate place within Hindu society. Groups that failed to win recognition as a caste were, literally, outcasts – in this stratified society, they did not even occupy the lowest rung. They became known as Untouchables. They had to live apart from all other people and scrape together a living in humiliating and disgusting ways, such as sifting through garbage dumps for scrap material. Even members of the lowest caste avoided mingling with them, eating with them, touching them and certainly marrying them. In modern India, matters of marriage and work are still heavily influenced by the caste system, despite all attempts by the democratic government of India to break down such distinctions and convince Hindus that there is nothing polluting in caste mixing.3 Purity in America A similar vicious circle perpetuated the racial hierarchy in modern America. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the European conquerors imported millions of African slaves to work the mines and plantations of America. They chose to import slaves from Africa rather than from Europe or East Asia due to three circumstantial factors. Firstly, Africa was closer, so it was cheaper to import slaves from Senegal than from Vietnam. Secondly, in Africa there already existed a well-developed slave trade (exporting slaves mainly to the Middle East), whereas in Europe slavery was very rare. It was obviously far easier to buy slaves in an existing market than to create a new one from scratch. Thirdly, and most importantly, American plantations in places such as Virginia, Haiti and Brazil were plagued by malaria and yellow fever, which had originated in Africa. Africans had acquired over the generations a partial genetic immunity to these diseases, whereas Europeans were totally defenceless and died in droves. It was consequently wiser for a plantation owner to invest his money in an African slave than in a European slave or indentured labourer. Paradoxically, genetic superiority (in terms of immunity) translated into social inferiority: precisely because Africans were fitter in tropical climates than Europeans, they ended up as the slaves of European masters! Due to these circumstantial factors, the burgeoning new societies of America were to be divided into a ruling caste of white Europeans and a subjugated caste of black Africans. But people don’t like to say that they keep slaves of a certain race or origin simply because it’s economically expedient. Like the Aryan conquerors of India, white Europeans in the Americas wanted to be seen not only as economically successful but also as pious, just and objective. Religious and scientific myths were pressed into service to justify this division. Theologians argued that Africans descend from Ham, son of Noah, saddled by his father with a curse that his offspring would be slaves. Biologists argued that blacks are less intelligent than whites and their moral sense less developed. Doctors alleged that blacks live in filth and spread diseases – in other words, they are a source of pollution. These myths struck a chord in American culture, and in Western culture generally. They continued to exert their influence long after the conditions that created slavery had disappeared. In the early nineteenth century imperial Britain outlawed slavery and stopped the Atlantic slave trade, and in the decades that followed slavery was gradually outlawed throughout the American continent. Notably, this was the first and only time in history that slaveholding societies voluntarily abolished slavery. But, even though the slaves were freed, the racist myths that justified slavery persisted. Separation of the races was maintained by racist legislation and social custom. The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of cause and effect, a vicious circle. Consider, for example, the southern United States immediately after the Civil War. In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution outlawed slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that citizenship and the equal protection of the law could not be denied on the basis of race. However, two centuries of slavery meant that most black families were far poorer and far less educated than most white families. A black person born in Alabama in 1865 thus had much less chance of getting a good education and a well-paid job than did his white neighbours. His children, born in the 1880S and 1890s, started life with the same disadvantage – they, too, were born to an uneducated, poor family. But economic disadvantage was not the whole story. Alabama was also home to many poor whites who lacked the opportunities available to their better-off racial brothers and sisters. In addition, the Industrial Revolution and the waves of immigration made the United States an extremely fluid society, where rags could quickly turn into riches. If money was all that mattered, the sharp divide between the races should soon have blurred, not least through intermarriage. But that did not happen. By 1865 whites, as well as many blacks, took it to be a simple matter of fact that blacks were less intelligent, more violent and sexually dissolute, lazier and less concerned about personal cleanliness than whites. They were thus the agents of violence, theft, rape and disease – in other words, pollution. If a black Alabaman in 1895 miraculously managed to get a good education and then applied for a respectable job such as a bank teller, his odds of being accepted were far worse than those of an equally qualified white candidate. The stigma that labelled blacks as, by nature, unreliable, lazy and less intelligent conspired against him. You might think that people would gradually understand that these stigmas were myth rather than fact and that blacks would be able, over time, to prove themselves just as competent, law-abiding and clean as whites. In fact, the opposite happened – these prejudices became more and more entrenched as time went by. Since all the best jobs were held by whites, it became easier to believe that blacks really are inferior. ‘Look,’ said the average white citizen, ‘blacks have been free for generations, yet there are almost no black professors, lawyers, doctors or even bank tellers. Isn’t that proof that blacks are simply less intelligent and hard-working?’ Trapped in this vicious circle, blacks were not hired for whitecollar jobs because they were deemed unintelligent, and the proof of their inferiority was the paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs. The vicious circle did not stop there. As anti-black stigmas grew stronger, they were translated into a system of ‘Jim Crow’ laws and norms that were meant to safeguard the racial order. Blacks were forbidden to vote in elections, to study in white schools, to buy in white stores, to eat in white restaurants, to sleep in white hotels. The justification for all of this was that blacks were foul, slothful and vicious, so whites had to be protected from them. Whites did not want to sleep in the same hotel as blacks or to eat in the same restaurant, for fear of diseases. They did not want their children learning in the same school as black children, for fear of brutality and bad influences. They did not want blacks voting in elections, since blacks were ignorant and immoral. These fears were substantiated by scientific studies that ‘proved’ that blacks were indeed less educated, that various diseases were more common among them, and that their crime rate was far higher (the studies ignored the fact that these ‘facts’ resulted from discrimination against blacks). By the mid-twentieth century, segregation in the former Confederate states was probably worse than in the late nineteenth century. Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University of Mississippi in 1958, was forcefully committed to a mental asylum. The presiding judge ruled that a black person must surely be insane to think that he could be admitted to the University of Mississippi. The vicious circle: a chance historical situation is translated into a rigid social system. Nothing was as revolting to American southerners (and many northerners) as sexual relations and marriage between black men and white women. Sex between the races became the greatest taboo and any violation, or suspected violation, was viewed as deserving immediate and summary punishment in the form of lynching. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist secret society, perpetrated many such killings. They could have taught the Hindu Brahmins a thing or two about purity laws. With time, the racism spread to more and more cultural arenas. American aesthetic culture was built around white standards of beauty. The physical attributes of the white race – for example light skin, fair and straight hair, a small upturned nose – came to be identified as beautiful. Typical black features – dark skin, dark and bushy hair, a flattened nose – were deemed ugly. These preconceptions ingrained the imagined hierarchy at an even deeper level of human consciousness. Such vicious circles can go on for centuries and even millennia, perpetuating an imagined hierarchy that sprang from a chance historical occurrence. Unjust discrimination often gets worse, not better, with time. Money comes to money, and poverty to poverty. Education comes to education, and ignorance to ignorance. Those once victimised by history are likely to be victimised yet again. And those whom history has privileged are more likely to be privileged again. Most sociopolitical hierarchies lack a logical or biological basis – they are nothing but the perpetuation of chance events supported by myths. That is one good reason to study history. If the division into blacks and whites or Brahmins and Shudras was grounded in biological realities – that is, if Brahmins really had better brains than Shudras – biology would be sufficient for understanding human society. Since the biological distinctions between different groups of Homo sapiens are, in fact, negligible, biology can’t explain the intricacies of Indian society or American racial dynamics. We can only understand those phenomena by studying the events, circumstances, and power relations that transformed figments of imagination into cruel – and very real – social structures.

### 2AC---Hope Good

#### Hope is good for mental health

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Discussion The current study investigated the relationships between hope, suicidal ideation, and the interpersonal risk factors of suicidal desire (Joiner, 2005) in a sample of African American college students. Consistent with previous literature, hope was negatively correlated to symptoms of depression, thwarted belongingness, and perceived burdensomeness. Hope was not significantly correlated to suicidal ideation in this sample. However, the agency subscale of hope was negatively correlated to suicidal ideation. To expand on the simple associations between hope and suicidal ideation previously established in the literature, the current study took a contextualist approach. More specifically, through the use of moderation analyses this study sought to better understand the circumstances of the established relationship between hope and suicidal ideation in an African American sample. It was hypothesized that levels of hope would moderate the relationship between feelings of perceived burdensomeness and thoughts of suicide. As hypothesized, the relationship between perceived burdensomeness and suicidal ideation was moderated by hope. High levels of hope weakened the relationship between perceived burdensomeness when statistically controlling for symptoms of depression. In other words, at high levels of hope, the relationship between perceived burdensomeness and suicidal ideation was no longer strong and positive as seen with low levels of hope. These results suggest that those who are naturally more hopeful are buffered against deleterious effects (i.e., suicidal ideation) when experiencing feelings of perceived burdensomeness. Individuals who feel comfortable setting goals and are motivated to achieve them may be better equipped to cope with feelings of perceived burdensomeness. Those who are more hopeful but feel as though they are a burden on others may be better equipped to cope with these feelings, as they may be able to naturally identify ways they can contribute to the well-being of others and are motivated to achieve these goals. This, in turn, may protect against thoughts of suicide when experiencing feelings of perceived burdensomeness. Also consistent with hypotheses, high levels of hope weakened the relationship between thwarted belongingness and suicidal ideation after controlling for symptoms of depression. Simple slope analyses indicated that the relationship between thwarted belongingness and suicidal ideation was strong and positive at low levels of hope but unrelated at high levels of hope. This result suggests that even though extreme feelings of social disconnection and unreciprocated caring are strongly associated with suicidal thinking, this relationship may only exist in those who are low in hope. Individuals who naturally engage in goal-directed thinking and are motivated to identify and use pathways to obtain their goals may feel as though they are more equipped to find solutions to feeling disconnected from others. Thus, when a hopeful individual feels thwarted in their belonging, they may be less likely to experience the negative effects of this feeling because they are better able to work toward connecting with others. Generally, the results of the current study indicate that African Americans who exhibit higher levels of hope (i.e., engage in goal-directed thinking, can identify pathways to achieve goals, and are naturally motivated to achieve their goals) may be buffered against suicidal ideation even in the presence of prominent interpersonal predictors of suicidal desire (i.e., thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness). This investigation is timely, as the ITS has received empirical support as a strong model of understanding suicide in the general population (i.e., Joiner et al., 2009), African Americans (Davidson et al., 2010), American Indian/Alaska Natives (O’Keefe et al., 2013), elderly populations (Jahn & Cukrowicz, 2011), and veterans (Anestis, Bryan, Cornette, & Joiner, 2009). Although feelings of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness have been linked to thoughts of suicide in African Americans in both the current investigation and previous work (Davidson et al., 2010; Hollar, 2010; Lamis & Lester, 2012), the current study indicates that this relationship may only detrimentally affect those African Americans who are less hopeful. Specifically, for less hopeful participants, as their perceptions of being a burden and not belonging increased, so did their thoughts of suicide.

#### Activism combats race-related stress

Caroline Reid 18, “Activism as a Source of Strength for Black College Students at Predominately White Institutions,” https://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=honors\_theses

Racism is deeply ingrained in American society, and white supremacy and the oppression of people of color has greatly contributed to the establishment of the very institutions that continue to perpetuate its existence today. Racism manifests itself in a variety of ways, and its most constant and daily appearance is in instances of microaggressions. These experiences contribute to feelings of invisibility, frustration, and anger, an experience known as racism- related stress, which research has shown to severely and negatively impact mental health. In order to combat the insidious effects of racism, Black Americans have utilized coping mechanisms for generations. This resiliency is astoundingly powerful, however, dealing with the omnipresence of racism is a constant and significant internal labor. For Black college students at predominately white institutions, microaggresions and systemic racism create a difficult environment to navigate. Unique opportunities in activism manifest themselves as tools to combat discrimination and racism-related stress. However, some argue that caution is needed in viewing activism as panacea for improving the lives of people of color, particularly Black people. Indeed, some research has suggested that activism is harmful to mental health, as it increases the intensity and frequency of experiences of perceived racism among some populations. This thesis includes a meta-analysis that examines the findings on the effects of activism on mental health. As a result of this analysis, a counter argument argues the potential of the utilization of activism as a source of strength that may combat the harms of racism, supporting the earlier claim that certain factors involved in activism may be protective in nature.

### 2AC---Reformism Good

#### Political change is possible, worthwile, and requires specific targetted political strategies

Lester **Spence 15**. Poli Sci Prof @ John Hopkins. 2015. “Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics.” pp. 140-147.

All four examples have a few things in common. First all occurred at a moment where all seemed lost. While I wouldn’t go as far as to suggest that these events suggest that neoliberalism is “naturally” contested—just as there is no “good teaching gene” there is no “contest neoliberalism gene”—I would say that while the neoliberal turn has signifcantly altered our ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability. It still exists. It exists in institutions we have written of thinking they are no longer relevant—like teachers unions. It exists in populations we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of radical political action— black youth. It exists in cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle —like Jackson, Mississippi. Second all three recognized the fundamental role politics played in their struggles. The black youth organizers recognized that they had to pressure Maryland state legislators to kill the prison. The black radicals in the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement made electing Chokwe Lumumba a component of their organizing. The CTU chose to take the city head on and to hold a series of town hall meetings designed to inform people of the ways political officials, philanthropists, and corporations are working together to neoliberalize and kill public education. The #blacklivesmatter movement recognized that politics was at the center of their struggle in Ferguson, Baltimore, and elsewhere. All campaigns used moral language in making their arguments. In Jackson they argued that the current way power was allocated in Jackson was immoral because it largely concentrated all of the benefits into a few (predominantly white) hands. In Baltimore they argued that putting $104 million to the goal of incarcerating youth was immoral given the lack of money being spent on youth in other areas, and later that Freddie Gray’s (and before him Tyrone West’s) murder was immoral. In Chicago they argued that closing 50 schools was immoral because it severely impacted the ability of poor black parents and black students to get the same degree of learning their white counterparts had. However, they didn’t rely on those arguments. They understood that seizing power (rather than speaking truth to it), that proposing new alternatives, would at some level have to involve political struggle. Morality wasn’t enough. Even if we had a common defnition of morality, a Christian-infuenced morality for example, that sense of morality could still be interpreted in diferent ways based on material interest. Relying on morality can make it hard to move against the wealthy charter school proponent who sincerely believes that privatizing public schools represent the best hope for increasing positive outcomes among black children. Relying on morality can make it very difficult to argue against the political bureaucrat who says — as they did in the case of Baltimore —that the conditions of youth currently held in adult prisons is so bad that the moral choice would be to give them their own facility where they won’t have to face the risks associated with being housed with adults. In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should act morally—I do believe our politics have to be rooted in a certain sense of ethics. We should never, however, ignore the fundamental role politics plays and should play in our struggle. Not only did they focus on politics, they all relied on political organizing. Organizing that included long discussions about political issues that mattered, but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another. In general, people do not come to a common understanding of the structural dynamics of the problem they face, and to a common understanding of what the solution should be, through being exposed to a charismatic speaker, or through “loving black people”, without having the space to talk about the issues in depth over a long period of time. The CTU organized for several years to be able to get a 90% vote. The infrastructure black youth in Baltimore relied upon was by definition designed to inculcate critical thinking skills as well as a sense of the way racism worked at structuring black life chances. The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement worked for years to build the critical capacity required to elect Chokwe, first to the City Council, then Mayor, and to put the political platform into action. There is no way to get around the fact that the type of work we have to do to rebuild a sense of the public interest is going to take a long time and has to start by building connections between people who may not think of themselves as political, who may not think of the various issues they struggle with as being the product of the neoliberal turn, who may not know what neoliberalism is. What I am referring to here is not the same as getting people to attend a rally or a march. I’m referring to political organizing— building the capacity of people to govern and make important political decisions for themselves —not political “mobilizing”. Mobilizing people for a protest act of one kind or another may get people out to engage in a specific act, but unless combined with organizing work, will not cause those people to organize for themselves. Tird in each case they were not only reactive, they were not only being critical of the turn and its efects, they proposed a positive alternative. Protest is not enough. Just as the neoliberal turn did not simply occur when the welfare state was removed, rather it occurred when the welfare state was removed and then replaced with a new program, we will not be able to build a sustainable constituency for a new world without articulating as clearly as possible what that new world will look like, what type of policies would result, what the benefits of those policies would be. Fourth while each of these instances represent responses against the neoliberal turn broadly considered, they each began locally. Te Malcolm X Grassroots Movement has several chapters throughout the country and has already held one conference (planned before Lumumba’s untimely passing) about the Jackson model (which itself is partially based on ideas developed in Spain) and how to export it to other cities. Te movement against the proposed youth jail in Baltimore relied in part on data accumulated by the ACLU on the schoolto-prison pipeline. And as I noted above the Chicago Teachers Union have begun organizing events all across the country to get people to understand how the privatization movement in education afects them. And each of the #blacklivesmatter campaigns began with a specifc local act of police brutality and used that act to organize locally. With this said though each case represents a local struggle people could experience directly. Mark Purcell (2006) argues that academics and activists alike run the risk of falling into the “local trap” by arguing that there is something inherently better and anti-neoliberal about organizing locally. I agree with him a little. Te Civil Rights Movement represented in large part a fght against white supremacy as embedded in local and state politics —the local was not the site of empowerment but rather the site of profound disempowerment for black people throughout the North and the South. However at the same time I argue that sustainable organizing is more likely to occur in response to a local issue (a local school closing, a rise in foreclosures in a local neighborhood, a jail built up the road, a local referendum) that can then be connected to other local issues and made national rather than the other way around. And again the Civil Rights Movement represents the best example of this —people weren’t interested in ending Jim Crow as much as they were interested in desegregating the buses they took to work everyday, desegregating the restaurants they passed on the way to school, desegregating the schools themselves. Fifth they used a variety of black institutions in their struggles. Te Baltimore youth all attended black public schools in Baltimore. Tey used the public schools to garner support for their work and to build relationships with black adults and black children. While a number of Baltimore area churches do promote the prosperity gospel, not all do. A few black churches in Baltimore became critical spaces for organizing against the jail—in fact I ended up fnding out about the movement against the jail in the frst place through hearing a young progressive black nationalist Baltimore pastor speak about the movement. And they used popular culture. Tey used poetry, they used rap and hip-hop, they used parties, understanding that while again the national terrain for hip-hop may move with rather than against the neoliberal turn, they themselves could use it to speak to their local condition. And later they used these same institutions and spaces for their fght against police brutality. Similarly in Jackson the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement did not operate from a clean slate. Tey relied on professors from nearby Jackson State University, they used connections with local churches to gain support for their activities. And the CTU was itself located in one of the most important institutions in black communities, schools. Lastly, they all relied on the fundamental premise that black people had the capacity to be the change they wanted to see in the world. Tey neither believed that black people’s fundamental condition was bruised and broken, nor did they believe that black people because of the contemporary condition didn’t love each other. At the same time though they understood explicitly and implicitly that love was not enough. And while each organization does have a number of leaders they have largely (though not fully) stayed away from the type of prophetic politics that have often created problematic internal hierarchies. Again there are signifcant diferences between these instances. And even though each of these instances were victorious ones that helped to change the terrain of political struggle, there is still much more to be done. In the case of Baltimore they stopped the youth jail but were not able to stop the privatization of Baltimore youth recreation centers, nor have they been able to (as of yet) redirect the $104 million to more progressive ends. Jackson elected Lumumba mayor but after his untimely passing his son ended up coming in second. Chicago teachers made substantial gains as a result of the strike but they were not able to prevent the 50 schools from being closed. Te #blacklivesmatter movement as it stands has not gone without critique. Te most notable one is that even though the project has increased the range of black lives that people are willing to fght for, it still hasn’t gone far enough. Although it’s reasonable to assume, based on the limited data we have, that black boys and young men are victimized by police more than other populations (and to the extent the zero-tolerance technology itself generates broader forms of policing in places like schools), black boys and young men are not the sole target. Black women have been victimized both directly and indirectly by police, as have black transgender populations. These acts have in many instances been as violent as those perpetrated against their male counterparts, and they have been videotaped as well. But they haven’t garnered the same degree of support and/or outrage. Extending the #blacklivesmatter movement to include the lives of black women and transgender populations that are also the victims of police violence would be more than simply a good thing. However there’s a more systemic problem at work. Te idea behind “black lives matters” represents an opportunity to organize around and against a certain type of sufering, a uniquely black sufering, made possible by the neoliberal turn. (It bears repeating, this is not simply the “new Jim Crow” at work. Te odds that someone like me would sufer the type of horrifc death someone like Freddie Gray did is very slim.) However the politics of the #blacklivesmatter movement do not quite match the phrase. Every single time the #blacklivesmatters movement appears it does so in the presence of either a horrifc instance of black death or a startling instance of police brutality. One could argue given this that the real politics of the movement refect the concept that (graphic) black death matters rather than black life. Tis move makes a great deal of sense — one way to think about this move is to think about the way civil rights movement activists used non-violence. Particularly when news cameras were present, non-violent tactics of protest tended to really highlight how violent and terroristic white supremacy in the South and other places was. However, by privileging the graphic black death, the victim shot in his back while running away, the victim who had his back violently broken by police, it ends up ignoring the many forms of non-graphic black death that occurs not because of police violence per se, but because of economic violence. If Freddie Gray weren’t murdered by the police but rather experienced a slow death due to lead poisoning it’s unlikely we’d be talking about him right now. It’d be unlikely that Baltimore would’ve had anything like an uprising. Following up, by privileging black death, graphic black death, we privilege certain types of tactics, strategies, and institutions. We counter the spectacle of the murder with the spectacle of the mass assembly, in the form of the protest march, or the spectacle of the mass disruption, in the form of the highway stoppage, or even in the form of the type of violent actvity the uprising hinted at. Actions in other words that are not only designed to transform the event into a black-and-white catalytic moment where people and the institutions around them feel forced to make a choice for the status quo or against it. And the organizations and institutions we call into being end up being those designed to generate these types of activities and to generate support for these activities (in order to grow the organizations and institutions themselves). As far as solutions go, we also privilege anti-police legislation, and perhaps more broadly, legislation designed to counter the school to prison pipeline. Te political solution for black life matters is to reduce the likelihood of a graphic singular black death— a kid shot on the way to the corner store, a young man shot while holding a BB gun he may have planned on purchasing, a black couple driving a car with a tendency to backfre. Te types of politics that generate change when the deaths come slow, painfully, and in aggregates, or when the issue is an entire legal framework (like the Maryland Law Enforcement Ofcers Bill of Rights) is a diferent politics. It is not solely or primarily a politics of the spectacle. Spectacle can work here in instances. It can be used to mobilize support. It can be used to increase awareness and general participation. And sometimes in combination with other tactics it can be used to disrupt. To generate and prolong crises. Te types of crises that engendered the same type of problems that caused the neoliberal turn. Certainly in the case of Baltimore a range of institutions and elites had no ready-to-roll-out solutions to the issues that the uprising called up. But these aren’t enough. It requires a politics attuned to the type of long term institution building that builds the capacity of individuals to govern and devise alternatives themselves. It also requires a solution set that is more about combating the type of long term institutional violence that doesn’t necessarily have a Trayvon Martin or a Freddie Gray at the center. Te types of violence that, instead might have Freddie Gray at the center, but not at the moment of his murder but at the moment he was found to have lead poisoning. I use these examples in order to argue that we aren’t starting from scratch necessarily— some of the work is already being done on the ground. I use these examples in order to show that we already have the seeds for a new institutional framework that re-roots the economy in politics and in the public interest. To show that we aren’t alone, and that a number of people recognize another way of life is possible. There aren’t as many of us as we’d like, but there are far more of us than we think.

### 2AC---Alt

#### The alt fails and reinscribes totalitarianism

**Condit 15** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

The theories of social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are, however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement: There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don't know the shape of what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek's attack on the evil Totality (“capitalism,”5 pp. 41/49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage”6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap”7 (p. 81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The resilience of this social theory identifies it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To appropriate Kenneth Burke's terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar” and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

#### Alt fails

Day 9 (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, ttp://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical\_failure\_of\_aanarchism\_chris\_day\_kasama.pdf)

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally, revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously, there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future

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#### Topical affs must define new conduct as anticompetitive---squo-descriptive ev doesn’t make sense in this context

Buntin et al ’21 [Jeff; Nina Fridman; Teja Leburu; Ezra Louvis; Ayush Midha; Bryce Rao; Tim Wegener; 2021; Authors of the 2021-22 Antitrust Topic Paper; “Antitrust Controversy Area Proposal,” http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?PHPSESSID=e2e756d656e1b8a153a09f02b950342b&action=dlattach;topic=7654.0;attach=2847]

The core controversy for this topic concerns whether the federal government should enforce antitrust laws more stringently, against a wider range of conduct. “Antitrust laws” includes three core statutes: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. There hasn’t been a significant update to statutory antitrust law in 60 years, and there has been a long-term decline in the vigor with which antitrust actions are pursued by federal regulators and upheld by the courts. Crucially, we suggest that the topic require the affirmative to expand the reach of antitrust law, rather than merely increase enforcement of existing antitrust law. The core controversy for the topic concerns whether firms today – from the “tech giants” of Amazon/Apple/Google/Facebook to energy firms and health care conglomerates – have escaped antitrust scrutiny due to too-narrow interpretations of anticompetitive practices regulated by the above statutes. Expanding the reach of antitrust law – in other words, defining new/additional conduct as anticompetitive and regulating on that basis – would be a large change from the status quo (one that Congress and the Biden administration are almost certainly not going to enact), and it builds in two core negative counterplan approaches: enforce existing law more aggressively, and regulate practices directly through non-antitrust means. The core debates will revolve around whether the harms of current concentration of market power outweigh the downsides of a more activist role for government in regulating the market to ensure competition. This topic will feature debates about the most interesting and controversial sectors in the U.S. economy, from artificial intelligence to news media outlets to renewable energy producers. The way we organize our economy matters for everything, and this topic will allow students to explore broad-ranging implications for the structure of the economy through a mechanism that is constrained enough to produce deep clash – the ideal balance for a season of debates.